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In this chapter, we analyze worker displacement (permanent job
separations initiated by employers because of adverse economic condi-
tions) in the United States and the Netherlands.  Labor displacement
has been widely studied in the U.S. context, where adequate data have
been available for a considerably longer period than in most other
countries.  No similar literature exists for the Netherlands, even though
displacement is an increasingly important phenomenon there.1  We dis-
cuss the relevant institutions and provide an empirical analysis of the
incidence of displacement and the labor market transitions and earn-
ings changes induced by displacement in both countries.
Our analysis of worker displacement generally identifies displace-
ment as permanent (rather than temporary) layoffs, controlling to vary-
ing extents for the cause of job termination.  In much of the analysis,
we focus on workers with substantial tenure or compare their experi-
ences to those of dislocated persons with less tenure.  Restricting our
analysis to permanent layoffs is almost irrelevant in the Netherlands
because temporary layoffs with recall are rarely observed there.  In
fact, Dutch institutions work against them.  Arrangements for provid-
ing unemployment insurance (UI) to workers who are laid off tempo-
rarily, for instance, are restricted to very specific activities.2
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This chapter also provides new information on the relationship
between displacement and retirement.  In the 1970s and the 1980s, dis-
ability insurance (DI) was allegedly used as a convenient alternative to
unemployment insurance for the separation of workers in the Nether-
lands.  Early retirement arrangements may also have facilitated the dis-
placement of older workers.  Although the data for the Netherlands
provide some information on transitions from employment into these
alternative destinations, this information is not as rich as for other
issues addressed below.  Therefore, we mainly discuss the relevant
institutional arrangements and findings from existing empirical work
in order to clarify the role of DI and early retirement in the Nether-
lands.  Surprisingly, despite richer data, there has been little previous
analysis of the relationship between displacement and retirement in the
United States.  A preliminary investigation of that relationship is also
provided in this chapter.
Our discussion of displacement in the United States frequently
refers to the results of an extensive North American literature on dis-
placement.  These data are well known and were designed specifically
for the study of displaced workers.  As a result, this chapter provides
only a modest updating of prior U.S. analyses.  In contrast, our Dutch
analyses require data from various sources, none explicitly addressing
displacement, and represent the first substantive study of these issues.
Our discussions of the Dutch data and results, therefore, usually need
to be more extensive than those for the United States.
The plan of this chapter is as follows.  First we discuss institutions
that are relevant to displacement (such as wage formation, employment
protection, and social security) and the data sets used in the analyses.
We continue by discussing time-series and cross-sectional properties
of displacement rates.  Then we analyze labor market transitions fol-
lowing displacement and wage or earnings changes induced by dis-
placement.  We finish by discussing the role of early retirement and DI. 




Compared with most other industrialized nations, U.S. labor mar-
kets are highly flexible.3  Few workers are unionized and minimum
wages are low as a fraction of average earnings.  In 1996, for example,
union members accounted for only 14.5 percent of total wage and sal-
ary employment and 10.0 percent of private wage and salary workers
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997, Table 688).  Effective September 1,
1997, the minimum wage was raised to $5.15 per hour.  Even after this
increase, however, it was only about 40 percent of the average hourly
earnings of production workers.4
Employment protection
Employees in most European nations have considerable protection
against “unjust” dismissals.  In contrast, the U.S. “employment-at-
will” doctrine provides U.S. employers with wide latitude to terminate
workers for almost any reason.  There are important exceptions, how-
ever, for unionized workers and for individuals with contracts contain-
ing provisions governing discharges.  Some state courts have also
recognized exceptions that limit dismissals when employees perform
acts serving the interests of public policy (such as jury duty) or when
an implied contract exists due to written or oral statements made by
employers.  Some courts have upheld “good faith” provisions requiring
employers to treat workers in a “fair and reasonable” manner in all
employment relationships, including terminations.5  Since the Worker
Retraining and Notification Act (WARN) took effect in 1989, employ-
ers with more than 100 full-time workers have been required to provide
60 days’ written advance notice of plant closings or mass layoffs.
However, the law contains numerous exemptions, and a preliminary
analysis by Addison and Blackburn (1994) suggested that the legisla-
tion has had little effect on the provision of notice.
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Programs to assist displaced workers
The United States provides limited support to workers who lose
jobs.  By far the most important assistance comes from unemployment
insurance.  The UI program is overseen by the U.S. Department of
Labor but administered by the individual states, resulting in variation
in program eligibility and benefits among geographic locations.  Work-
ers with qualified employment histories are eligible for benefits if they
are available for work and have become unemployed due to involun-
tary separation from their jobs (without good cause) or voluntary sepa-
ration with good cause.6  Benefit duration is generally restricted to 26
weeks, although up to 13 additional weeks can be obtained under the
Extended Benefits Program, if the state unemployment rate is suffi-
ciently high.7  Almost all wage and salary workers are covered by the
UI system, but only a fraction of the unemployed actually receive ben-
efits (36 percent in 1995).8  Wage replacement rates are also relatively
low, generally ranging from 50 to 70 percent of the individual’s aver-
age weekly pretax wage up to a state-determined maximum, and these
funds are taxable as normal income.  Due to the ceiling, benefits are
somewhat progressive and typically average between 30 and 40 per-
cent of previous earnings. 
Other programs assist job losers more directly.  Trade Assistance
Adjustment (TAA), originally enacted in 1962, targets persons dis-
placed from industries adversely affected by import competition.
Qualifying workers can receive up to 52 weeks of combined UI and
Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) benefits, 76 weeks if enrolled
in an approved training program, with TRA generally paid at the same
rate as UI.  TRA is a limited program, however; only 31,000 workers
were supported in 1994, at a cost of $120 million.9  Some assistance is
also provided to dislocated workers under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Worker Security Act and the Employment
Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Program.  In addition,
a variety of demonstration programs have been implemented to test the
efficacy of particular assistance strategies for displaced workers.10  The
relatively small size of these efforts implies that most displaced work-
ers receive relatively limited support from the government beyond that
available to persons who are jobless for other reasons.11
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The Netherlands
Wage formation
Minimum wages in the Netherlands are higher than those in the
United States.  As of July 1998, the minimum wage has been set at
14.01 Dutch guilders (f.; U.S.$7) per hour before taxes and social secu-
rity premium payments.12  In contrast to the United States, 75 percent
of all employees are covered by collective agreements, which are nego-
tiated by central bargaining between large firms or employer organiza-
tions and unions.  The resulting agreements, called Collectieve Arbeids
Overeenkomsten (CAOs), are usually, but not always, put in terms of
lower bounds on the terms of employment, notably the wage.  Since
1927 central agreements reached by worker unions have, by law, also
been applicable to nonunion employees.  Another law, passed in 1937,
enabled the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment to declare col-
lective agreements binding for entire sectors.  Such extensions of the
scope of CAOs, called Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring (AVVs) are
indeed common practice.13
Employment protection
Although there is currently a tendency toward more flexible
employment relations, employment protection is stronger in the Neth-
erlands than in the United States.  Employment relationships are
arranged by either fixed-term or permanent contracts.14  Fixed-term
contracts allow employers to lay workers off at the end of the con-
tracted period without either prior notice or a permit, therefore offering
no employment protection to the employee.  If the employee is allowed
to continue to work after the contracted period, however, or if a new
fixed-term contract is written within 31 days of the end date of the first
contract, the employee is considered to be working on a “continued
contract,” and is basically provided the protection of a permanent con-
tract.15
As long as workers and firms are bound by a contract, they can
separate only after a permit has been granted by a regional employment
institution, although this rule is generally applied only to firm-initiated
separations.  Employers always need a permit for dismissal or layoff of
workers unless there is mutual agreement between the employer and
the employee, severe misconduct by the employee (like stealing),
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bankruptcy of the employer, or unless the employment contract is dis-
solved by a court.  Permits are usually granted for dismissal based on
low employee performance and for layoffs necessitated by economic
circumstances (displacement).  Dismissal because of illness, marriage,
pregnancy, or military service is prohibited.  Court cases and permits
are frequently used to dissolve labor contracts.
Both employers and employees who want to end their employment
relationship are bound by mandatory advance-notice requirements.
Advance-notice periods are always shorter than six months.  Exact
durations depend on age, tenure, and the type of contract involved.16
Severance pay is generally provided only in cases where the contract is
dissolved by a court and the employee is not declared responsible.  In
these cases, severance pay is typically between one and two months’
salary per year of tenure.
Public pensions and other programs assisting 
displaced workers
Assistance to unemployed displaced workers is far more generous
in the Netherlands than in the United States.  The most important
source of income for workers displaced from private sector jobs is
unemployment insurance, which is set according to the Unemployment
Law.17  A worker in the Netherlands is entitled to UI benefits if he or
she has been employed for at least 26 of the prior 52 weeks, faces a suf-
ficiently large, unpaid, reduction in working hours, and is willing to
accept a new job.18  Benefits equal 70 percent of the gross wage in the
last job before unemployment to a maximum (as of January 1999) of
217 f. (U.S.$105) per day and are subject to income tax.  The maxi-
mum duration of these benefits ranges from six months to five years,
depending on the employment history of the unemployed workers.19
Some unemployed workers are entitled to an extension of these bene-
fits at a level related to the mandatory minimum wage.20  If, after the
expiration of UI benefits, the unemployed individual has not found a
job, he may receive subsistence benefits (social assistance), which are
means-tested (by household income) and related to what is considered
to be the social minimum income.21  The Unemployment Law provides
some arrangements for “short-time unemployment” due to weather
conditions, but none for temporary layoffs.  This may be the reason
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that temporary layoffs are not an important phenomenon in the Nether-
lands (see Emerson 1988).
According to the Unemployment Law, a worker has to prevent
unnecessary job loss in order to be entitled to UI.  The administrators
of the unemployment benefits system, mainly organized at the level of
the industry, are authorized to impose sanctions on unemployed work-
ers who have violated this rule.22  Thus, to the extent that they do not
immediately move into new jobs, most displaced workers in the private
sector can be identified as workers flowing into UI and not receiving
sanctions for unnecessary job loss.  Because of the institutional
arrangements, this definition restricts attention both to longer service
workers, although not necessarily workers with long tenure in their last
jobs, and to layoffs due to economic conditions.  In this context, it is
relevant that UI premiums are not experience rated at the level of the
individual firm.23
Other social security schemes have also served as destinations for
displaced workers during some periods in recent history, disability
insurance being a well-known alleged escape route for displacement.24
In the 1970s and 1980s, DI was more attractive than UI for both
employers and employees in terms of replacement rates and, perhaps,
less negative stigma effects.  In 1990, there were in fact 139 DI claim-
ants for every 1,000 workers in the Netherlands, while there were only
78 in Sweden and 43 in Germany (Aarts, Dercksen, and de Jong 1993).
Since Dutch workers are not likely to run much higher health risks than
workers in Sweden and Germany, this suggests that Dutch DI serves
more goals than just disability insurance.25  Policy changes in the late
1980s and the 1990s have been directed at preventing abuse of DI.
First, DI replacement rates were reduced in 1985 and 1987.  Stricter
rules concerning disability, and more extensive monitoring, were intro-
duced in the 1993 law.  As a consequence, the DI rate has now reduced,
after increasing continuously until 1985 (CTSV 1997).
Another possible escape route for displaced workers is early retire-
ment.  Since the late 1970s there have been arrangements for retire-
ment before the standard retirement age (65 years), which were
formally established by law in 1981.  There is some circumstantial evi-
dence that early retirement may be relevant to worker displacement:
labor-force participation rates of Dutch men over age 50 decrease rela-
tively quickly with age compared to other OECD countries (Thio
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1997).  The use of early retirement to avoid layoff costs in case of dis-
placement is clearly restricted, however, by specific age requirements.
Also, early retirement schemes have recently been incorporated in pri-
vate so-called flexible pension plans, which may reduce the scope for
abuse of this scheme.  Additional information on the role of DI and
early retirement is provided at the end of this chapter. 
DATA
United States
Significant improvements in data availability have led to an explo-
sion of analysis on U.S. displaced workers during the last decade.  The
majority of this research has used information available from the Dis-
placed Worker Supplements (DWS) to the Current Population Survey
(CPS).  The first DWS was conducted in January 1984, with new sup-
plements released at two-year intervals since that time.  Until recently,
the surveys collected information for workers losing jobs in the five
calendar years prior to the interview date.  Beginning in 1994, the sur-
veys were switched from January to February and the period over
which job loss was measured was cut from five to three years.  Infor-
mation is collected on pre- and postdisplacement job characteristics
and on the intervening period of joblessness.26  Sample sizes are rea-
sonably large, the DWS data can be supplemented with the information
contained in the normal monthly CPS, and the information is fairly
easy to analyze.27  The new analysis of displacement contained in this
chapter uses data from the February 1996 DWS and CPS and focuses
on 20- to 64-year-old workers (at the survey date) losing jobs due to a
plant closing, slack work, or position or shift abolishment.  In order to
make the investigation more comparable with that conducted for the
Netherlands, many of the results focus on persons losing jobs that have
lasted at least one year.  Special attention is also paid to those who are
out of work for some time following the termination. 
For all its strengths, the DWS has a variety of disadvantages.  First,
the data are retrospective and subject to recall bias.  Second, informa-
tion is available for only one lost job, and data on company characteris-
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tics or the situation prior to displacement are limited.  Most
importantly, it is difficult to construct a comparison group of nondis-
placed workers.28  This has led some researchers to use longitudinal
data sets (such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics) or administra-
tive data (such as payroll or unemployment insurance records) to ana-
lyze the incidence or consequences of displacement.29  These alternate
sources have advantages, particularly the availability of a comparison
group, but they also have problems.  For instance, sample sizes of dis-
placed workers are typically quite small in panel data, and the reason
for job change often cannot be identified from administrative sources.
The Netherlands
There is no equivalent to the DWS for the Netherlands.  We have
access, however, to three microdata sets that contain information on
various aspects of displacement: the Firm Employment (FE) data set,
an administrative longitudinal UI data set of the Dutch Social Security
Council (Sociale Verzekeringsraad or SVr), and the Labor Force Sur-
vey (LFS) of the Netherlands Organization for Strategic Labor Market
Research (OSA).  Unlike the DWS these data allow, to some extent, for
the construction of comparison groups of nondisplaced workers.  For
some of the analyses, however, sample sizes are small compared to the
DWS.
The FE data set is constructed by sampling individuals from
administrative records of firms covering the period 1992–1996.  It pro-
vides information on tenure and separation, reasons for separation, and
a variety of individual and job characteristics.  The data provide very
useful information on the incidence of displacement and shed some
light on labor market transitions immediately following displacement.
However, the FE data are silent about subsequent labor market transi-
tions and earnings losses.
The UI data set provides information on unemployment spells of
all workers entering UI in 1992.  Because all unemployed workers in
the market sector with sufficiently long employment records end up in
UI, and the data reveal worker-initiated separations, these data can be
used to study reemployment durations after displacement, conditional
on a positive non-employment spell.  Since these data show the entire
inflow into UI by sector, municipality, and month, we can also con-
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struct indicators of excessive inflow into UI in local labor markets,
which can be used as indicators of excessive, or even mass, layoffs.
Earnings losses, however, are not observed in this data set either: for
this we require the LFS data, a labor-force panel survey covering the
period 1985–1990.  The LFS data set provides extensive information
on labor market transitions and earnings, but suffers from small num-
bers of displaced workers.
Table 2.1 summarizes the main features of the data.  Because the
Dutch data sets have not been used to study displacement before, we
will discuss these in more detail.  The appendix provides additional
information.
The Firm Employment Data
The Firm Employment data (or Arbeidsvoorwaardenonderzoek in
Dutch) are firm-worker data collected by civil servants (of the Labor
Inspection Service, or Arbeidinspectie) of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment (Ministerie van Sociale Zaker en Werkgelen-
heid).  These data provide information on the incidence of displace-
ment over the period 1992–1996.  The data are collected yearly (in
October 1993–1996) as repeated cross sections from administrative
wage records of a sample of firms by means of a stratified two-step
sampling procedure.30
In the first step a sample of firms is drawn (about 2,000 in each
year) from the Ministry’s own database (which is roughly similar to the
database of firms of Statistics Netherlands, CBS).  In the second step, a
sample of workers (about 26,000 per year) is drawn from the records of
the firms selected in the first step.  The workers are sampled from
administrative records of two moments in time, one year before the
sampling date and at the sampling date.  A distinction is made among
employees who are present in both years (“stayers”), workers who are
present only in the first year (“leavers”), and workers who are present
only in the second year (“entrants”).  More than 75 percent of the
workers are stayers.  Information obtained on the way leavers separate
from firms is later used to distinguish between displacement and other
separations.
The data set includes additional information on wages, hours
worked, days worked, and a number of other variables, including age,
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gender, education, job complexity, occupation, SIC industry code, firm
size, and type of wage contract.
The UI Data Set
The UI data, which are provided by the SVr, are administrative
data from the sectoral organizations that implement the unemployment
insurance system.  The data cover all individuals who started collecting
UI benefits in 1992.  Individuals are followed up to September 1993, if
necessary.  Note that for a given individual the date of inflow into UI as
a rule coincides with the date of inflow into unemployment.  For each
individual we know the duration of UI benefit receipt, except when it is
right-censored by the end of the observation period (late 1993); that
occurs in 17 percent of all cases.  If the UI duration is completed we
know the exit state, which is usually either employment (67 percent of
the completed spells) or continued unemployment after completion of
UI entitlement (14 percent).  Only 8 percent of the spells end because
of transitions into DI, and hardly any UI spells in our sample end in
retirement.31  Apart from this, we do not have information on events
occurring after individuals leave UI. 
We observe whether individuals have had a sanction imposed right
at the start of the UI spell.  These sanctions are punitive benefit reduc-
tions that are applied if the UI applicant is considered to bear at least
some responsibility for his job loss.  Thus, this variable can be used to
control for worker-initiated separations, as far as these are not excluded
by restricting attention to UI inflow.  Otherwise, the number of explan-
atory variables is limited by the character of the data set.  The data do
not contain the exact magnitude of the individual UI benefit level.  The
magnitude is a direct function of the wage earned before entering
unemployment, however, affected by personal and household charac-
teristics.  Both the wage and these characteristics can be observed, but
the data provide only limited information on individual maximum UI
entitlement, except of course when the individual is seen to complete
entitlement.
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The Labor Force Survey of the OSA
The OSA Labor Supply Panel Survey, or just LFS, is a panel which
started in 1985.  Presently four waves are available (April–May 1985,
August–October 1986, August–October 1988, and August–November
1990).  In the LFS a random sample of households in the Netherlands
is followed over time.  Because the study concentrates on individuals
between 15 and 61 years of age who are not full-time students, only
households with at least one person in this category are included.  For
households chosen, all individuals in this category (and in all cases the
head of the household) are interviewed.  The first wave consists of
4,020 individuals (in 2,132 households).  The four waves together con-
tain information on 8,121 individuals. 
In every interview, retrospective questions are asked to elicit infor-
mation on possible labor market transitions made by the respondent
during the period between the prior and current interviews.32  This pro-
cess allows us to reconstruct the sequence of labor market states expe-
rienced by 8,075 respondents, with the sojourn times and income levels
in all these states.33  The LFS data identify employment, self-employ-
ment, unemployment, not-in-labor-force, military service, and full-
time education as labor market states.34  The respondent is asked to
provide a motive or cause for each transition between any two of these
labor market states and to indicate whether the transition was made
voluntarily.35  This information enables us to distinguish displacement
from other separations.  We will come back to this issue when we dis-




Farber (1997) estimated displacement probabilities, over three-
year periods, using information from all the available Displaced
Worker Supplements.  A crude estimate of annual job loss due to plant
closing, slack work, or position or shift abolishment is obtained by
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dividing his estimated values by three.36  These results, displayed in
Table 2.2, reveal displacement rates of between 2 and 4 percent per
year, with higher probabilities for men than women.  Displacements
are somewhat countercyclical—e.g., notice the high rates during the
recessionary period in the early 1980s and the low rates during the eco-
nomic expansion at the end of the decade—but there is little indication
of a time trend.37
There are at least two reasons why these estimates understate dis-
placement probabilities.  First, the DWS records a maximum of one job
loss during the three-year period, thus missing multiple separations.38
Second, the surveys suffer from recall bias, whereby terminations
occurring further in the past are more likely to be forgotten (Topel
1990; Evans and Leighton 1995).  Table 2.3 provides estimates of
annual displacement rates for the 1993–1995 period, with an attempt
made to correct for both sources of bias.  The top section shows esti-
mates for all types of displacements, whereas the second is limited to
job loss resulting in an initial period of joblessness.  This is done to
make the results more comparable to those of the Netherlands and
some of the countries analyzed in other chapters of this volume, where
data limitations restrict the analysis to displacements that lead to unem-
ployment.
The first row of each section shows estimated displacement rates
both for all workers and separately by gender.  The “correction”
involves two parts.  First, it is assumed that an equal number of persons
are displaced in all three years.  Second, it is assumed that in each of
the next two years 10 percent of the workers displaced in any given
year experience a second job loss.39  Using these assumptions, persons
losing jobs in 1995 should account for 29.9 percent of the displace-
ments observed in the 1996 DWS.40  Instead, 47.5 percent of displaced
workers in the 1996 DWS report losing their jobs in 1995, suggesting
that the number of displacements is understated by around 59 percent
(0.475/0.299 = 1.589) and that the corrected annual displacement prob-
ability is 4.9 percent (0.031 H 1.589 = 0.049).  A similar procedure
yields a 5.3 percent estimated rate of annual job loss for men and 4.5
percent probability for women.41  The corresponding entry in the bot-
tom section deflates the displacement probability by the percentage of
job losers who obtain new employment without an intervening spell of
non-employment.  For instance, 14.4 percent of displaced individuals
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do not experience any initial joblessness, implying that 3.8 percent
(0.049 H 0.856 = 0.042) are expected to lose positions and become job-
less.
The remainder of the table provides estimates of annual displace-
ment rates as a function of tenure in the predisplacement job.  Since
Farber (1997) did not break down his statistics by tenure, additional
steps are required to obtain these estimates.  First, the predisplacement
tenure distribution of workers losing jobs between 1993 and 1995 is
calculated from the 1996 DWS.  Second, the job tenure of all 20- to 64-
year-old workers in February 1996 is estimated using data from the
monthly CPS.  Third, a relative risk of displacement is calculated by
dividing the share of displaced workers in a tenure group by the corre-
sponding share for all workers.  Finally, this relative risk is multiplied
by the aggregate displacement rate to arrive at a probability of job loss
for each tenure category.  For example, persons with 1–2 years of pre-
separation tenure accounted for 26.8 percent of displaced workers but
just 13.2 percent of the nondisplaced, implying a relative risk of 2.03
(0.268/0.132) and an estimated annual displacement rate of 9.9 percent
(2.03 H 0.049).  This procedure is performed separately for men and
women, as well as for both together.  
Table 2.3 shows an almost monotonic negative relationship
between job tenure and the probability of job loss.  Persons holding
jobs for ten or more years are only about one-fourth as likely to be dis-
placed as those in positions that have lasted for just a year or two.  The
one exception to this pattern is that persons in the first year of the job
appear to have somewhat lower displacement rates than those with one
to two years of tenure.  This result is probably erroneous, for two rea-
sons.  First, recall bias is probably most severe for very short-tenure
workers, since these persons may incur few adjustment problems when
their positions end.42  Second, information on predisplacement tenure is
missing for 11 percent of the displaced workers; these individuals are
excluded from the calculations in the table.  If, as is likely, data are
missing relatively frequently for very brief employment spells, the
share of displacements and the corresponding risk of job loss will be
understated for this group.  Overall, the evidence strongly suggests that
displacement rates fall with job tenure.43
The age pattern of displacement rates over the 1993–1995 period is
shown in Table 2.4.  These estimates adjust the overall displacement
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probabilities in Table 2.3 by the age-specific relative probabilities of
job loss calculated by Farber (1997).  For example, the probability of
displacement is 11.6 percent higher for 20- to 24-year-olds than for all
workers, implying an estimated displacement rate of 5.5 percent (0.049
H 1.116 = 0.055).  The table shows clear evidence that probabilities of
job loss decline with age, but the profile is not nearly as steep as for job
tenure.  For instance, 55- to 64-year-olds are roughly three-quarters as
likely to be permanently laid off as 20- to 24-year-olds.
The lack of a comparison group in the DWS makes it difficult to
perform a regression analysis of the determinants of displacement.
However, Farber (1997) estimated a series of probit models where the
dependent variable indicated whether or not a job loss had occurred
over a three-year period and the regressors were limited to characteris-
tics observed at the survey date.  His analysis confirmed that displace-
ment probabilities decline with age and indicated lower rates of job
loss for educated workers, women, and whites.
The Netherlands
Reasonably long displacement-rate time series can be constructed
from aggregate UI data, giving the yearly numbers of new UI cases and
data on the number of employed individuals at risk.  The merits of the
first series as a measure of displacement have been discussed in the
institutions and data sections.  Although it provides only an imperfect
measure of displacement, it is the only measure for which we can con-
struct time series over several business cycles.44  Ideally, one would
like to measure the number of individuals at risk as the number of
employed individuals who would be eligible for UI benefits in case of
displacement.  Unfortunately, we have to approximate this series by
the number of employed individuals paying UI premiums.  Because
this number includes individuals with employment histories insuffi-
cient for UI eligibility, it provides an upper bound to the number of
individuals at risk.  As a consequence, the rate computed is a lower
bound on the true rate of displacement leading to positive unemploy-
ment spells.
Figure 2.1 graphs the annual displacement-rate time series con-
structed in this manner, together with real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growth in the Netherlands (percentage change from previous
year) for the period 1970–1993.  The rate of displacement is clearly an
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upward trend over the data period, rising from around 4 percent in
1970 to 11 percent in 1993.45  As is to be expected, we also observe
strong fluctuations over the business cycle, with steep increases in
1970–1972, 1973–1975, 1979–1982, 1986–1987, and 1990–1993.
Comparing this to the superimposed macro indicator, real GDP
growth, we see that displacement rates are countercyclical.  Notable
exceptions are 1976–1977, 1984–1985, and 1989–1990, which are all
years with decreasing growth and displacement rates.  A simple expla-
nation could be that the downturns of the business cycle led to worker
displacement, although this seems not to be true for the early 1970s.
However, the correlation between the two series is –0.58.  A regression
of displacement on GDP growth and time shows that displacement
changes –0.33 (s.e. 0.12) percentage points for each percentage-point
increase in real GDP growth, and 0.15 (s.e. 0.03) percentage points per
Figure 2.1 Netherlands: The Annual Rate of Displacement
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year (R2 = 0.69).  We do not find significant coefficients for one- and
two-year lagged GDP growth. 
The FE data can be used to study the variation of displacement
over groups of workers.46  For each separation, information is available
that is helpful in identifying displacement.  Among other things, the
data distinguish layoffs, separations because of the expiration of fixed-
term contracts, and transitions into other jobs, DI, and early and normal
retirement.47  It should be understood that this information comes from
administrative records of the firm and is therefore limited by the obser-
vational scope of the firm’s administration.  For instance, a worker
who is given notice of layoff in the near future may quit immediately to
go to another job (before the date of layoff) in order to avoid unem-
ployment.  In such a case, the worker would most likely be recorded as
a job-to-job mover, without any reference to the layoff.  A worker who
stays with the firm until the date of layoff, however, is most likely to be
recorded as a laid-off worker.  For the latter worker the data do not pro-
vide information on the labor market state occupied just after displace-
ment.  Similar arguments can be made for workers moving into DI or
early retirement.  For a worker observed to move into early retirement,
for instance, we do not have independent information on the circum-
stances leading to early retirement.  Thus, the causes of separations and
destinations of labor market transitions following separations are inter-
twined in the data, and we have to decide on an appropriate way to
identify displacement.
We have opted for the following method.  For all firms, workers
under age 60 with tenure of at least one year who are recorded to be
laid off are considered to be displaced.  As argued above, some dis-
placed workers who immediately find a new job, or move into DI or
early retirement, will be excluded by this definition of displacement.
To include at least some of these cases, we will label leavers moving
into new jobs, DI, or early retirement from “strongly shrinking” firms
to be displaced as well.  Since there is no a priori reason to pick any
particular threshold employment-loss level, we have experimented
with a number of different criteria.  The results can be found in Table
2.5, which gives the contributions to the annual displacement rate over
the period 1993–1996 of separations from strongly shrinking firms by
type of separation for six different criteria.  The first question is
whether we should focus on net or gross employment (outflow)
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changes.  Using the latter, we will overestimate displacement rates in
high turnover sectors, where high simultaneous employment inflow
and outflow rates are no exception, whereas using the former we will
underestimate displacement at restructuring firms.48  The weakest crite-
rion in Table 2.5 results in an aggregate annual displacement rate of 7.2
percent, while the strongest criterion results in an aggregate displace-
ment rate of 3.5 percent, over the 1993–1996 period.  With all criteria,
we find that most workers displaced from strongly shrinking firms are
labeled as moving directly into new jobs, with almost as many labeled
as being laid off.  Early retirement and, in particular, DI seem of minor
importance.  Note again, however, that some of the workers labeled as
being laid off could have moved into new jobs, early retirement, or DI.
We will return to this issue later.  In what follows we use the net
employment criterion, with a –30 percent threshold, mainly because
other authors in this volume (Denmark, Belgium) do so.
First, we will give a short description of the variation in displace-
ment rates over time and among different categories of workers.  Table
2.6 shows that displacement rates are somewhat higher for men than
for women and that displacement rates are much lower for workers
with high tenure.  Note that, despite the institutional differences, the
results are very similar to those for the United States shown in Table
2.3.49  In both countries, low-tenure men have higher displacement
rates than low-tenure women, whereas at the highest tenure levels
women have higher displacement rates than men.  Table 2.7 shows that
displacement rates are highest in 1993 and lowest in 1996.  Since 1993
was the year in which the Netherlands had its lowest net employment
growth (it was even negative) and the Dutch economy has strongly
recovered since 1995, this result is consistent with countercyclical dis-
placement rates.  The table also shows that workers covered by a col-
lective agreement (CAO) have lower displacement rates than both
workers whose wage contract is required to follow CAO contracts of
other firms in the same sector (AVV) and workers with only individual
contracts.50  The finding that displacement rates are highest for AVV
workers could reflect the fact that firms are bound to pay such workers
wages that are agreed upon by other firms.  These wages may not
reflect the business conditions of AVV firms.  It is also interesting to
see that displacement rates for workers at simple jobs, for workers with
little formal training, and for young workers are relatively high.  This is
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in line with standard labor hoarding and human-capital theories.
Finally, we see that displacement rates decline with age. 
We continue to investigate the results by estimating a logit model
for the incidence of displacement (Table 2.8).  As the net marginal
benefits of displacing a worker will typically be influenced by macro-
economic conditions, we not only include firm and worker characteris-
tics, but sets of calendar-time and sectoral dummies, too.  It is
important to point out that some of the variables that are used as
explanatory variables may well be endogenous.  Employed workers
who have been relatively successful at avoiding displacement in the
past may have both a high current tenure and a low current probability
of displacement.  Employed workers who have been promoted  by
accident to a job with fringe benefits that exceed what they can get
from other employers may have both a high current tenure and a high
current probability of displacement.  This potential endogeneity ham-
pers straightforward interpretation of the parameter estimates.  Table
2.8 gives the corresponding estimates.  The displacement probability
decreases with tenure (up to some level), and with gross hourly wages,
and it increases with educational and job-complexity level.  It is also
relatively high for workers without collective contracts and workers
employed at large firms.  
Using these estimates, we compute displacement probabilities for
different types of workers.  We evaluate these probabilities at the esti-
mated parameter values and the mean observed characteristics.  Table
2.9 illustrates the partial effects of the different worker and firm char-
acteristics.  We see some differences from the exploratory results in
Table 2.7.  Controlling for other characteristics, the displacement prob-
ability no longer decreases with education and job complexity level.
Furthermore, displacement probabilities differ very little as a result of
the type of contract.  It appears that low-wage and low-tenure workers
have a particularly high probability of being displaced.  According to
the logit model, a worker with average characteristics who earns 15 f.
an hour faces a 4.3 percent chance of being displaced, whereas this
probability is only 1.1 percent for a worker who earns 50 f. an hour.
This is not a surprising result if wages are determined by a surplus
sharing rule, in which case matches with the highest surplus have the
lowest probability of ending. 
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Finally, note that displacement rates calculated with the FE data set
are lower than the UI inflow time-series figures because we observe
very few firm closings in the FE data.  Furthermore, we include indi-
viduals who lose only part of their job (those whose hours of work are
reduced) in the UI data, and we do not exclude individuals with sanc-
tions.51
TRANSITIONS
Labor Market Transitions after Displacement
United States
Job loss increases the risk that an individual will be out of work for
some period.  Swaim and Podgursky (1991) estimated that the median
worker is jobless for 25 to 30 weeks following a permanent layoff, and
Farber (1993) found that 29 to 38 percent of men displaced during the
previous two years were unemployed at the DWS interview date, com-
pared to 4 to 5 percent of the nondisplaced.52  Much of the employment
reduction is temporary, however.  Ruhm (1991a) estimated that unem-
ployment increases by around eight weeks in the year of the permanent
layoff, four weeks in the next year, but only around one week four
years after the event. 
The patterns of postdisplacement joblessness and labor-force status
for 1996 DWS respondents losing jobs that had lasted at least one year
are shown in Tables 2.10 and 2.11.  Table 2.10 shows the probability
that workers obtain new jobs within either six months or one year after
displacement.  By European standards, non-employment spells in the
United States are brief, with around two-thirds reemployed in six
months or less and three-quarters within a year.  Over 60 percent of
those with an initial spell of joblessness are working again within six
months and 72 percent in less than a year.  Men and short-tenure work-
ers obtain new jobs somewhat faster than women and those with longer
tenure.  The age differences in reemployment are fairly small through
the workers’ late forties, but workers beyond that age are much more
likely to have extended spells of joblessness.  This may represent
greater adjustment difficulties following displacement, but it could also
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confound the effects of job loss and retirement.  We return to this point
below.  Groups obtaining new jobs rapidly generally have rather high
rates of survey date employment.  The patterns of unemployment and
labor-force participation, however, are more divergent, as is shown in
Table 2.11.  In particular, the relatively low employment rates of
mature adults and women are explained by high rates of labor-force
withdrawal, rather than elevated unemployment. 
Econometric estimates of the determinants of postdisplacement
joblessness are summarized in Table 2.12.  The first column shows
results of a probit equation where the dependent variable equals one for
persons finding new jobs without any intervening joblessness and zero
for those who are out of work for at least one week.  The second shows
results of a Cox proportional hazard model where the dependent vari-
able is weeks of joblessness and the sample is restricted to those out of
work for at least one week.  The third shows corresponding hazard esti-
mates for the full sample, where the dependent variable is weeks of
joblessness plus one-half.  Thus, the second column indicates hazard
rates, conditional on a positive spell, while the third shows results for
the unconditional model (that includes both zero- and positive-week
spells).  The excluded reference category is a white, unmarried, female,
high school dropout, born outside the United States, with one to two
years of predisplacement tenure, age 20 to 29, who loses a job due to a
position or shift abolishment, and receives no written advance notice.
A higher hazard rate implies faster exit from joblessness and shorter
spells.
The results are generally consistent with those in earlier research.
Non-employment declines with education, increases with age, and is
higher for nonwhites than whites.  Men are just as likely as women to
experience some joblessness but transition into employment more
quickly.  Conversely, married and native-born persons are more likely
than their counterparts to move directly into new jobs but once out-of-
work show little evidence of faster reemployment.  Long-tenure work-
ers have relatively high probabilities of avoiding joblessness but may
have modestly lower reemployment hazard rates, conditional on a pos-
itive spell.  Persons involved in plant closings are more likely to move
directly into new positions than those losing jobs due to a position or
shift abolishment and have elevated reemployment hazards relative to
both this group and those displaced by slack work.53  Individuals
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receiving lengthy written notice are more likely than the non-notified
to avoid joblessness, but the notice does not appear to have any effect
on reemployment hazard rates.  Furthermore, the exit probabilities for
those with brief notice are, if anything, actually lower than for those
not receiving any written warnings.54
The Netherlands
Both the LFS and the FE data provide some information on the
labor market states occupied by workers just after displacement.  In the
LFS, we are able to distinguish job-to-job transitions (E-E), transitions
from employment to unemployment (E-U), and transitions from
employment to not-in-the-labor-force (E-N) in each individual labor
market history.  We use the self-reported motive or cause for each tran-
sition and the information on whether or not transitions are made vol-
untarily to distinguish displacement from other types of separations in
each case.  Details are provided in the appendix. 
Table 2.13 shows the number of displaced workers in our sample
by transition and motivation.  In total we observe 327 displacements.
The large majority, 70 percent, involve job-to-job transitions.  In con-
trast, in the United States many more workers experience a positive
non-employment spell.  As for motivations, in most cases (68 percent)
displacement is indicated by the most clear-cut motivation, “reorgani-
zation or plant closure” (of which 73 percent involve no joblessness).
Only a small share is due to DI (17 percent) or early retirement (1 per-
cent).  If we restrict attention to workers with tenure of at least one
year, only 162 displacements are left.  However, qualitatively similar
results hold for this subsample.
As we stated before, the FE data also give some information on the
labor market state just after displacement.  Although this data set does
not indicate the labor market state for those displaced workers labeled
as being laid off, firms may be involved in arranging DI and, in partic-
ular, early retirement if these destinations are really used as convenient
ways to displace workers.  In such a case we may expect these transi-
tions actually to be recorded.  Similarly, because of employment pro-
tection regulation, we may expect firms to be involved in reemploying
displaced workers, and so at least some job-to-job transitions of dis-
placed workers will be recorded.  In any case, the share of layoffs in
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overall displacement provides only an upper bound to the share of dis-
placed workers ending up in unemployment right after being displaced.
Table 2.14 compares the FE layoff rates, job-to-job transition rates,
DI inflow rates, and early retirement rates between firms shrinking by
30 percent or more and other firms.  We see that not only the layoff
rates but also the other separation probabilities are higher at the 30-per-
cent-shrinking firms.  This seems to indicate that at least some dis-
placed workers enter DI or early retirement, or move directly into
another job.  The second column for each type of firms shows, how-
ever, that a relatively high share of separations from shrinking firms
are labeled as layoffs, and relatively few as job-to-job transitions.  So,
most of the displacement seems to be captured by layoffs. 
The LFS data also provide information on the labor market states
occupied by displaced workers 12 months after displacement.  Table
2.15 gives the number of individuals in the different labor market
states, by type of transition made just after displacement.55  The table
shows that most individuals remain in the same state as they were
when they became displaced.  We cannot derive strong results on E-U
and E-N transitions because of the limited number of individuals in
these categories, but it seems that the job-to-job movers do not have
problems finding steady employment after being displaced. 
Finally, we can analyze reemployment durations following dis-
placement using the 1992 UI inflow data set.  We distinguish individu-
als who have been sanctioned for responsibility for job loss from
individuals who have not been sanctioned.  Only the latter are consid-
ered to be displaced.  The sanctioned individuals may then serve as a
“control” group, where we should acknowledge that this group con-
tains only individuals who are eligible for UI benefits and no individu-
als who have, for instance, also quit their jobs or who have been
dismissed for severe misconduct.  The groups may also differ for two
reasons other than cause of separation.  First, the “nondisplaced” indi-
viduals have been sanctioned, which implies that they face reduced
benefits for some period of time.  Second, workers are likely to be non-
randomly selected into both states, for which we will not directly con-
trol.
Table 2.16 presents summary statistics of reemployment durations
by demographic group.  Because 44 percent of the durations are right-
censored, we compute median durations, in particular median residual
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durations at 0 and 26 weeks.  From the upper segment we learn that the
median reemployment duration of all spells is 20.8 weeks.  For dis-
placed workers, the median duration is 3.5 weeks shorter than for sanc-
tioned workers.  The median residual durations at 26 weeks are 4–5
times larger, implying strong negative duration dependence of the cor-
responding reemployment hazard rates.  It is well known that this can
be explained by both “genuine” duration dependence at the individual
level (because of stigma effects or atrophy of skills), and dynamic sort-
ing because of exit-rate heterogeneity.56  The lower panel restricts
attention to displaced workers and gives median durations for various
demographic groups.  One feature worth noting is the strong increase
in median durations with age.  This may be due to the institutional
structure of UI, which is more generous for older unemployed and
unemployed with longer employment histories.  In addition, search
rules are less strict for older individuals.
We also develop a measure of excess layoffs in the local labor mar-
ket of each individual.  From the UI inflow census we can compute the
size of the inflow in UI in each month of 1992 in each Dutch munici-
pality by sector.  Thus, we can distinguish local labor markets by
municipality and sector, and define excess UI inflow in a local labor
market to be the inflow into UI in that market net of the overall average
inflow over time, municipality, and sector.  More formally, if Cmst is
the inflow in UI in municipality m in sector s in month t, then data on
Cmst for all municipalities, sectors, and months in 1992 are regressed on
municipality, sector, and time dummies, yielding both predicted counts
Cmst  and residual counts mst  = Cmst – mst for each cell or (m,s,t).
Now, each combination (m,s) represents a local labor market, and the
mst  is an indicator of excess layoffs in local labor market (m,s) in
month t.  We can assign each individual to a local labor market, and
use  as a regressor in an analysis of reemployment durations.  Be-
cause we will include province indicators instead of municipality indi-
cators in the duration analysis (for computational reasons), it is useful
to also include C as a regressor.  
The duration model for reemployment durations is specified as a
single-risk mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model, with the log haz-
ard for reemployment given by ln θ(t|x, v) = λ(t) + xN β = v, where λ is
a piecewise constant log baseline hazard, and β is the regressor param-
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indicator, the cell or local labor market indicators, and other individual
characteristics.  The variable v is an unobserved component which is
assumed to be discretely distributed so that, with n points of support,
Pr(v = vi) = pi, for i = 1, . . . n, and pn = 1 –3n–1i = 1 pi.57  We fix the num-
ber of mass points at n = 2 and perform sensitivity analysis by reesti-
mating the model for higher values of n.  Finally, we treat destinations
different from reemployment as randomly right-censoring the reem-
ployment durations.  We have right-censoring because of the fact that
individuals are followed only until late 1993.
Table 2.17 shows results from maximum likelihood estimation.
The most important finding is that individuals who are displaced
according to the sanction indicator, in other words, those who do not
have sanctions imposed, have approximately 20 percent higher reem-
ployment rates than sanctioned individuals.  Considering the fact that
sanctions are likely to increase reemployment rates if they have any
direct effect, this figure provides a lower bound on the difference
between displaced and nondisplaced workers, given a similar benefits
level.58  This result is consistent with the work of Gibbons and Katz
(1991) for the United States, who find that workers displaced because
of plant closings have shorter reemployment durations than workers
laid off because of slack work or elimination of a position or shift.  It is
also interesting to note that the predicted size of the local labor market
has a significantly negative effect on reemployment rates, which could
be a symptom of congestion effects in local labor markets.  It should be
noted that this variable is identified only from variation between
municipalities, as the model contains full sets of time and sector dum-
mies.  The wage has a significantly positive effect on reemployment
rates, and age a significantly negative effect (from age 16 onwards).
Wald-test statistics for the joint significance of the three sets of dummy
variables show that there is significant variation (at the 5 percent level)
among sectors, months of inflow, and provinces.  Most of the variation
in reemployment rates between cells or local labor markets is caused
by sectoral heterogeneity.  Finally, we find significant unobserved het-
erogeneity and negative individual duration dependence of reemploy-
ment rates.59
Table 2.18 gives reemployment probabilities computed with the
estimated model, by fixing the unobserved heterogeneity component at
its estimated mean and the regressors at the sample mean, and consid-
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ering one-by-one deviations of regressors from this mean.  Of the dis-
placed workers, 55 percent are reemployed within 26 weeks, 73
percent within 52 weeks.  For sanctioned individuals these probabili-
ties are slightly lower.  We still find strong negative effects of age on
reemployment probabilities.  Wages have positive effects on reemploy-
ment probabilities, ceteris paribus, a finding which overturns the
results from the raw median estimates.
Earnings and Wage Changes
United States
In addition to transitory increases in joblessness, labor displace-
ment in the United States is frequently accompanied by substantial and
lasting wage reductions.  Several studies have examined these earnings
losses in detail, using longitudinal or administrative data to allow a
comparison group of nondisplaced workers.  Using the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, Ruhm (1991a) found that job loss reduces weekly
wages by 14 to 18 percent in the following year and 11 to 15 percent
four years later, with little evidence of recovery beyond this point.  A
more recent study of the same data source by Stevens (1997) indicated
average decreases of roughly the same magnitude and pattern but fur-
ther highlighted that large losses are concentrated among persons expe-
riencing repeated turnover.  Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan’s 1993
analysis of administrative data for Pennsylvania workers with six or
more years of tenure on the predisplacement job uncovered a similar
time profile and even larger losses—quarterly earnings declined by 30
to 40 percent initially, with persistent losses of 20 to 30 percent.  The
variance of wage changes is also large, however.  Early studies by
Ruhm (1987) or Kletzer (1991), for example, pointed out that many
workers earn more after job loss than before it.  Storer and Van Auden-
rode (1997) suggested that uncertainty over potential wage changes is a
major source of the utility losses resulting from displacement, far out-
weighing the comparatively modest reduction in average wages.
Table 2.19 displays changes in average real weekly earnings
occurring between the time of a job loss and the survey date for respon-
dents to the 1996 DWS who have been displaced from jobs lasting at
least one year.60  The first column shows results for the subsample who
are working at the survey date; the second presents averages for the full
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sample, using a zero value for weekly wages for those not employed in
February 1996.  Average real weekly wages of reemployed sample
members do not change between the displacement and interview dates,
with gains observed for persons avoiding joblessness, men, and those
with little seniority on the lost job.
These relatively favorable results may partially reflect the robust
economic conditions in the United States during the time period ana-
lyzed.61  The findings are not inconsistent with the large earnings losses
mentioned above, however, for at least three reasons.  First, persons
who are not working at the survey date (and so are excluded from these
calculations) may have relatively low earnings potential.  Second, the
“before” versus “after” comparison does not account for changes that
would have occurred in the absence of the job loss (young workers, for
example, have steep age–wage profiles, suggesting that losses could
result from foregone growth in wages).  Third, pay frequently begins to
decline prior to the actual displacement (Hamermesh 1991; Ruhm
1991b; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993), implying that the earn-
ings reduction is understated by these estimates.  In addition, the
median displaced worker does considerably worse than the mean indi-
vidual—median weekly wages decline by 6 percent conditional on
reemployment and 30 percent for all job losers—demonstrating the
importance of considering the variance of wage outcomes.
The distribution of earnings changes is displayed in Table 2.20.  As
above, the analysis is restricted to those losing jobs that have lasted at
least one year.  The conditional estimates restrict the sample to reem-
ployed workers, whereas the unconditional results assume zero wages
for those not working in February of 1996.  The last two columns
restrict the sample to 25- to 49-year-old men in order to focus on a
group with particularly strong labor-force attachments.  The table high-
lights the substantial dispersion of postdisplacement outcomes.  Over
one-quarter of the reemployed workers earn at least 10 percent more
than before being displaced, and the pay of 18 percent increases by at
least 25 percent.  Even when persons not working at the survey date are
included and treated as having a zero wage, 20 percent receive a wage
premium exceeding 10 percent in the new job while 13 percent earn at
least 25 percent more.  Conversely, weekly earnings fall 25 percent or
more for 52 percent of all displaced individuals and for 32 percent of
those working at the survey date.  Interestingly, the results are quite
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similar for 25- to 49-year-old men, with the main exception being that
their higher rates of reemployment imply somewhat lower uncondi-
tional probabilities of large wage losses. 
Table 2.21 summarizes the results of a series of earnings regres-
sions for workers displaced from jobs lasting at least one year.  The
dependent variable in the first two columns is the natural log of weekly
wages in February 1996.  The second column includes predisplacement
wages as a regressor, whereas the first does not.  The outcome in col-
umn 3 is the change in weekly (ln) earnings.  Effectively, this specifi-
cation constrains the coefficient on previous wages to one, whereas
column 2 allows it to vary freely.62
Wage levels and changes could be affected by different factors.
Postdisplacement earnings will primarily reflect the general human
capital possessed by the individual, whereas reductions in pay can
occur from losses of firm-specific human capital, job or industry rents,
or idiosyncratic residuals (luck).  For instance, survey-date earnings
are positively related with predisplacement tenure but wage reductions
also increase with previous seniority, suggesting that the preseparation
tenure differential reflects a combination of specific and general
human capital.63  In contrast, education is positively correlated with
earnings on both jobs, suggesting that it provides general human capi-
tal.64  Men and married individuals also earn more on both jobs.  Con-
versely, persons 55 and over experience very large wage reductions.
There is little evidence of race or advance-notice effects, once the other
regressors are controlled for.  Interestingly, there is also an indication,
albeit only a modest one, that unionized workers suffer relatively large
losses following displacements.  Somewhat surprisingly, those dis-
placed due to slack work gain relative to those losing jobs because of
position or shift abolishment.65  Finally, the coefficient on the predis-
placement wage, in column 2, suggests that slightly over half of any
earnings residual received on the old job is transferred to the new posi-
tion.
The Netherlands
To analyze possible earnings losses between pre- and postdisplace-
ment jobs, we use data on transitions between jobs, either with or with-
out intervening non-employment spells, from the LFS.  Thus, we
consider E-N-E, E-U-E, and E-E transitions, of which we have 1,719
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observations in our sample, including both displacement and other
types of separation from the first employment spell.  Only one income
level is reported for each labor market spell.  However, under the
assumption that earnings do not vary within employment spells, the
change in earnings between pre- and postseparation jobs equals the
change of earnings between the date of separation and  the date of
entering the first new job.  To correct these earnings differentials for
inflation, we have used the monthly all-item Consumer Price Index
(CPI).66  After this inflation correction, 1,551 observations remain.67  If
we restrict our sample to workers with tenure of at least one year in the
first employment spell, we have 668 observations.68
The average post- to preseparation earnings ratio in this sample is
1.24, with a standard error (of the mean) equal to 0.02.  For the sub-
sample of displaced individuals (232 observations) this average equals
1.18, with a standard error equal to 0.04.  For our subsample of work-
ers with sufficient tenure we find an average earnings ratio of 1.24
(0.02) for all workers and of 1.14 (0.03) for displaced workers (116
observations).  In either case, real earnings rise significantly between
two consecutive employment spells.  Because there is no significant
difference between the ratio for all workers and that for displaced
workers (their 95 percent confidence intervals are overlapping), this
indicates that displacement has no significant effect on future earnings.
To investigate this further, we have regressed the log real earnings ratio
on tenure in the first employment spell, the duration of the intervening
non-employment spell (defined to be 0 for E-E cases), a dummy vari-
able indicating whether the separation involves displacement, and
some additional controls.  The estimation results are reported in Table
2.22.
The results confirm the preliminary conclusions from the compari-
son of the averages.  Displacement does not have a significant effect on
earnings after a separation.  Moreover, the first column shows that the
effect of displacement is very small if we do not include the tenure cri-
terion in the displacement definition.  In the second column, we find
some evidence of a negative effect of displacement if we restrict the
displacement indicator to separations of workers with at least one year
of tenure.  This is confirmed by estimates for the tenure-restricted sam-
ple in the third column.  Also, in all cases we find a significantly nega-
tive effect of the length of the spell of intervening joblessness.  Thus,
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workers who have been without work longer experience smaller earn-
ings gains.  This can be explained by either stigma effects or loss of
skills.  Log tenure is generally insignificant, but the results in the sec-
ond column indicate that workers with tenure below one year face sig-
nificantly smaller earnings gains.
Retirement and Disability
United States
As discussed, compared with younger individuals, older persons
obtain new jobs more slowly following displacements and suffer rela-
tively larger wage reductions when they do.  Rather than indicating a
causal effect, however, it is possible that the effects of aging and dis-
placement may be confounded.  This possibility is particularly impor-
tant given that labor-force participation rates fall rapidly once
individuals reach their late fifties; previous research provides little
insight, however, into the relationship between job loss and retire-
ment.69
Table 2.23 supplies information on labor-force participation and
retirement or disability status in February 1996 of displaced workers
with more than one year on the preseparation job.  The missing cate-
gory is “other” reasons for being out of the labor force.  Retirement and
disability status are combined because these are likely to be close sub-
stitutes for at least some older workers.  The table shows that retire-
ment or disability probabilities rise and labor-force participation rates
decline with age.  However, as discussed, this may represent the nor-
mal process of aging rather than any unique consequence of job loss.
To examine this possibility, we compare the labor-force status of dis-
placed and nondisplaced men (Table 2.24).  Displacement again
includes job loss in 1993, 1994, or 1995 due to plant closing, slack
work, or position or shift abolishment.  We focus on men because
women are much more likely to report being out of the labor force for
ambiguous “other” reasons.  Data are from the February 1996 Current
Population Survey and Displaced Worker Supplement.  
The table shows that male job losers are more likely than their non-
displaced peers to participate in the labor force but less likely to report
being retired or disabled.  Taken at face value, this suggests that per-
manent layoffs delay rather than promote retirement.  This could be the
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result of reduced wages (and a dominant income effect) or of other
financial losses (such as reductions in housing equity) that follow dis-
placement.  However, there is an important qualification to this inter-
pretation.  The participation and retirement rates of nondisplaced
individuals do not condition on labor-force status in previous years.  To
the contrary, one must be working to be at risk of displacement.  There-
fore, the probabilities for displaced men in Table 2.24 are dependent on
recent labor-force participation, whereas those for nondisplaced men
are not.  This distinction becomes increasingly important with age.  For
example, 62 percent of 62- to 64-year-old male job losers participated
in the labor force in February 1996, compared to 46 percent of men not
terminated.  Many of the latter group were likely to have left the labor
force several years earlier, however, implying that the conditional par-
ticipation probabilities are much higher.70
The following procedure was used to provide more comparable
estimates of survey-date labor-force status.  First, age-specific proba-
bilities of being in each labor-force state were calculated.71  Second,
lagged labor-force participation was estimated as the participation rate
of workers two years younger than the specified age.  A two-year lag
was chosen roughly to correspond to the average amount of time since
job loss for displaced workers.  Third, conditional labor-force partici-
pation rates for nondisplaced men were calculated as the difference
between current and lagged labor-force participation divided by the
lagged rate.  Similarly, conditional retirement or disability rates were
estimated as the difference between current and lagged values of retire-
ment or disability probabilities, divided by the lagged participation
rates.72
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 display the age-specific labor-force participa-
tion and retirement or disability probabilities for displaced and nondis-
placed men.  The unconditional estimates for nondisplaced men
correspond to those in Table 2.24; the conditional estimates were
obtained using the procedure described above.  As mentioned, nondis-
placed men have uniformly lower probabilities of participating in the
labor force and higher rates of retirement or disability. Conditional on
being in the labor force two years earlier, however, men in their middle
fifties and older who have not lost jobs are more likely to participate
and less likely to classify themselves as retired or disabled than those
who have lost jobs.  For example, the conditional retirement or disabil-
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Figure 2.3 United States: Retirement/Disability Rates of Displaced and 
Nondisplaced Males
Figure 2.2 United States: Labor Force Participation Rates of Displaced 
and Nondisplaced Males
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ity probabilities of 55-, 60-, and 64-year-old nondisplaced men are 2, 8,
and 27 percent, compared to 9, 16, and 38 percent for displaced men.73
These results suggest that job loss may hasten retirement.  Further anal-
ysis is needed before this conclusion can be asserted with confidence,
however.  
The Netherlands
The results from the analyses of labor market transitions following
displacement suggest that early retirement and DI have been used to
facilitate displacement in the Netherlands.  Recall, for example, that in
the LFS data (Tables 2.13 and 2.15) at least some displaced workers
withdrew from the labor force, either by early retirement or in DI, in
the 1985–1990 period.  The tables also indicate that this concerns at
most 10 percent of all displaced workers.  More surprisingly, the FE
data (Table 2.14) attribute some role to both early retirement and DI in
the 1993–1996 period, even though DI legislation had already under-
gone major changes to avoid improper use (see the institutional details
provided earlier).
The improper use of DI and the role of early retirement have
received ample attention in the Dutch policy debate, and numerous
empirical studies on these issues exist.  Although these usually do not
focus on displaced workers per se, some of these papers offer insights
that are useful in the context of displacement.
A series of papers has sought to explain the relatively high DI case-
load in the Netherlands (see Hassink, van Ours, and Ridder 1997 for an
overview).  The data suggest that before the reforms in the late 1980s
up to 50 percent of the DI inflow was related to “redundancy of work-
ers” and not to actual health problems.  This conclusion may appear
rather extreme, but it is consistent with the relatively high DI rates in
the Netherlands (see the earlier discussion of Dutch institutions).  Has-
sink, van Ours, and Ridder, using an OSA panel survey of  firms, esti-
mated that in the late 1980s (after the 1980s reforms) there was still 10
percent of the DI inflow that was related to redundancy.  Although
these authors did not investigate DI in the 1990s, one can expect that
the 1993 reforms have reduced this number even further.  
Thio (1997) used data from a 1993 survey among elderly heads of
households and their partners, conducted by the Centre for Economic
Research on Retirement and Ageing, to sample heads of household,
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53- to 63-year-olds, who were not working (were “retired”) at the time
of the interview, had been working at least up to age 40, and had been
working for at least three months with their last employer.  The data
distinguish various self-reported reasons for retiring from their last job.
One group of explanation corresponds to layoffs for economic reasons
(displacement).  Other categories are quits, health-related separations,
separations related to working conditions, and separations for family
reasons.  The data also distinguish various exit routes for retirement,
including early retirement and DI.  In the sample of retired heads of
households used, 37 percent were on DI and 43 percent were in early
retirement.  The average retirement age was 54 years. 
In 96 percent of the DI cases, health was reported as a reason for
retirement, and in 86 percent as the primary reason.  In 24 percent of
the DI cases, layoff was reported as a reason, but in only 8 percent as
the primary reason.  This seems consistent with the results found by
Hassink, van Ours, and Ridder (1997): the average time between retire-
ment and the survey was five years, implying that the results were
roughly applicable to the late 1980s.  Furthermore, since the data
applied to the period before the major DI reform of 1993, the results
were again likely to overestimate the current role of DI in facilitating
adjustment to displacement.  Of individuals in early retirement, 37 per-
cent reported layoff as a reason for retirement, and 26 percent reported
layoff as the primary reason.  Thus, it seems that a significant share of
the inflow into early retirement was related to displacement.  Finally, it
was shown that 60 percent of retirement due to layoffs, including those
retired in UI and other schemes, was concentrated among 54- to 59-
year-olds, and only 9 percent concerned individuals of age 60 and up.74
CONCLUSION
Discussion
This chapter analyzes the incidence and consequences of displace-
ment in the United States and the Netherlands.  For the United States,
we provide an illustrative investigation using data from the February
1996 Current Population Survey and attached Displaced Worker Sup-
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plement.  For the Netherlands, no equivalent to the Displaced Worker
Supplements exists, and so displacement is studied using three longitu-
dinal data sets: an administrative firm-worker data set, an administra-
tive UI data set, and a labor-force panel survey.
Although the scope for direct comparisons between the United
States and the Netherlands is limited by differences in the available
data, several interesting comparisons can be drawn.  First, the evi-
dence indicates that displacement is a common event and occurs with
roughly the same frequency in both countries: during the 1993–1995
period, between 3 and 4 percent of persons holding jobs lasting more
than one year were estimated to have been permanently laid off and to
have experienced at least some unemployment.  Displacement proba-
bilities are also lower for women than men and decline with job tenure
in both nations.  Termination rates are estimated to fall with age and
education in each country.  These effects may reflect other factors,
however, and do not persist in the regression analysis provided for the
Netherlands.  Employment terminations also appear to hasten retire-
ment or transition into disability status in both the United States and
the Netherlands, and there is reason to believe that the consequences
of displacement were less severe in the booming U.S. labor market of
the mid 1990s than in earlier years.  In contrast, displacement in the
Netherlands seems to have been more frequent in the 1990s than in the
1970s and 1980s.
Patterns of non-employment following displacement exhibit
intriguing differences and similarities for the two countries.  As might
be expected, terminated workers in the Netherlands are out of work for
a much longer period of time, conditional on experiencing some job-
lessness.  A much larger share of displaced workers move into alterna-
tive employment directly, however, without experiencing unemploy-
ment.75  The lower Dutch reemployment hazard rates are consistent
with the possibility that greater labor market rigidity and support dur-
ing periods of joblessness reduce both the opportunity and the incen-
tive to obtain new positions.  The higher frequency of direct transitions
into new jobs is harder to explain.  Possibly the data are inadequate to
make this comparison (the DWS data in the United States, for example,
may miss many displacements that result in direct transitions to new
employment).  Alternatively, the employment protection provisions in
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the Netherlands may be more likely to restrict displacements to cases
in which new jobs have already been obtained or are readily available.  
Despite the aforementioned differences, there are many common
patterns of post-termination joblessness in the two countries.  For
example, reemployment hazard rates decline with age and are lower for
women (compared to men) in both nations.  The data also suggest neg-
ative duration dependence in the United States and the Netherlands.
Finally, the overall probabilities that displaced workers are reemployed
within six months or one year are surprisingly similar in the two coun-
tries.  These similarities suggest that there may be adjustment patterns
following job loss that are common among many countries, and per-
haps even universal, despite substantial differences in institutional
arrangements.
It is difficult to compare the wage changes that follow job loss in
the two countries.  As already mentioned, one problem is that patterns
of reemployment are so different in the United States and the Nether-
lands.76  In the Netherlands, displaced workers experiencing positive
non-employment spells are likely to be out of work for sufficiently
lengthy periods to have sorting and stigma effects and loss of skills that
significantly affect their labor market position per se (see Andersen
1997).  This hampers the interpretation of empirical results on this
wage difference.77  Also, given the difficulties in getting a job once
unemployed, workers in the Netherlands who expect displacement may
have particularly strong incentives to search actively for another job
while still employed.  Consequently, some job-to-job transitions may
be the result of anticipated displacement.  Indeed, if unemployment
durations are long, employment may be an even more important desti-
nation state following displacement.78  Again, this suggests that issues
like sorting are important and that workers moving directly into other
jobs in the Netherlands may be quite different from their U.S. counter-
parts.  Another problem is that only the data analyzed for the Nether-
lands allow for a comparison of displaced and nondisplaced workers.
On the other hand, since sample sizes are small for the Netherlands, it
is not possible to say much about how the experiences differ among
groups.
This notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that there is no evidence that
mean wages decline following displacement in either country.  The
point estimates actually show significantly higher subsequent earnings
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in the Netherlands and no change in the United States.  This suggests
that the losses in average earnings of reemployed workers should take
the form of slower wage growth than for workers avoiding displace-
ment, rather than of outright reductions in compensation (as is shown
in the Dutch data).  The variance of outcomes is substantial, however.
For example, the U.S. evidence indicates that substantial earnings
losses are experienced by older workers, those displaced from long-
tenure jobs, and those whose earnings were originally relatively high
compared to others with similar observable characteristics.  Finally, the
results suggest two important sources of risk beyond any expected
changes in wages for reemployed workers.  The first relates to uncer-
tainty regarding duration of the spell of joblessness and the second to
the substantial variance of subsequent earnings experienced by work-
ers on their new jobs.  These risks and the institutional arrangements
for dealing with them are also related to the experiences of displaced
individuals.  For instance, Dutch workers who experience unemploy-
ment following displacement may have longer spells than their U.S.
counterparts precisely because the Dutch social protections reduce the
size of loss during periods of unemployment.  This could result in
reduced dispersion of postdisplacement wage changes, conditional on
reemployment, because workers have less incentive to obtain new jobs
that pay substantially less than their old ones.
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Notes
We thank Peter Kuhn and Christian Dustmann for useful comments on earlier drafts of
this chapter.
1. Displacement rates increased from about 4 percent in 1970 to 11 percent in 1993,
according to a rough estimate based on the unemployment insurance (UI).  Dis-
placement rates are lower in 1994–1996, however, than in 1993.  See the section
on incidence for details.
2. Temporary layoffs may occur in less organized ways, however.  Seasonally
unemployed workers, for instance, can sometimes receive UI.  Institutional details
and a discussion of the consequences for our analysis are provided in later sec-
tions.  Emerson (1988) discussed the role of temporary layoffs in various industri-
alized countries.
3. See Siebert (1997) and Nickell (1997) for recent, and somewhat conflicting, dis-
cussions of the role of labor market rigidities in explaining the disparate employ-
ment experiences of the United States and Europe.
4. Production workers averaged $12.39 per hour in September 1997 (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 1998).
5. More detailed discussion of these issues are provided in Krueger (1991) and Der-
touzos and Karoly (1993).
6. Generally individuals must have worked at least two quarters and earned a mini-
mum amount (typically between $500 and $3000, depending on the state) during
the year prior to the immediately completed calendar quarter.  The claimant must
also be available for, and able to, work if a “suitable” offer is received.
7. Most of the information in this and the next paragraph comes from the Committee
on Ways and Means (1996).
8. For displaced workers, a somewhat larger fraction probably qualify for benefits.
Data from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement indicates, for instance, that 44
percent of the 25- to 64-year olds losing jobs due to plant closings, slack work, or
position or shift abolishment between 1993 and 1995 received UI.
9. Payments under TAA were much larger in earlier years, peaking at 532,000 per-
sons and $1.6 billion in 1980.
10. Leigh (1995) and Kodrzycki (1997) provided useful summaries of these programs
and their effectiveness.
11. The total budget for dislocated worker programs funded through the Employment
and Training Administration of the Department of Labor was $1.1 billion in fiscal
year 1996 (Office of Management and Budget 1998).
12. Minimum wages in the Netherlands are actually set as monthly wages.  They can
be transformed to hourly minimum wages by dividing the sector-specific normal
working hours.  The reported hourly minimum wage is valid for a 38 hour/week
sector.  For young workers up to 23 years of age, minimum wages are lower.
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13. One of the data sets used in our analyses distinguishes between individuals
employed under CAO contracts or AVVs and employees who are not covered by
either of these.  See the data section.
14. In recent years, so-called flexible contracts have been used increasingly.  Such
contracts do not specify working hours and correspond more closely to U.S.
employment-at-will arrangements.  In 1996, however, only 6 percent of all work-
ing hours were controlled by such flexible contracts (CBS 1998).
15. Note that employers have to avoid such “continued contracts” in several ways, by
only offering new contracts after slightly more than 31 days.  Although such con-
tracts are not formally “continued contracts,” employees have been successful in
fighting such contracting behavior in court.  Also note that, currently, laws are
proposed that allow for more flexible fixed-term contracting, offering less protec-
tion to the employee.
16. In case of separation, advance-notice periods start after a permit has been granted
and, if not specified otherwise in the contract, generally equal the time between
two subsequent wage payments, as a base.  This period is usually one month.  In
addition, however, the employer must give one week’s notice for each year of the
employee’s tenure, up to a maximum of 13 weeks, with one additional week per
year of tenure for employees of age 45–65, up to a maximum of 26 weeks.
Advance-notice periods can be contracted, instead.  However, such periods can
never be excluded, nor can they exceed six months.
17. Actually, there are two laws, of 1949 and 1987, which were both revised in the
1990s.
18. We use administrative UI data for 1992–1993 in this chapter.  To qualify as
unemployed, the individual has to face a reduction of at least five hours of work
per week or half of his original hours if he worked fewer than 10 hours per week.
19. For example, to get an initial benefit-entitlement period of five years, the unem-
ployed worker has to have had jobs for at least 40 months, including at least three
of the five years just prior to the start of the unemployment spell.
20. The extended benefits are equal to 70 percent of the gross minimum wage or 70
percent of the gross wage in the last job before unemployment, whichever is
lower, and are again subject to income tax.  Unemployed who have had jobs in the
last three of the last five years are eligible for extended benefits, for a maximum
duration of one year, or sometimes longer for older workers.
21. In general, welfare is applicable to all jobless not covered by UI, DI, or other
schemes, and provides benefits at the subsistence level (currently around $500
after taxes per month for singles without children).
22. A UI recipient should 1) take actions to avoid staying unemployed—to search for
a job and accept appropriate job offers, register as a job searcher at the public
employment office, participate in education and training, etc., and 2) keep the
administration informed about everything that is relevant to the payment of his UI
benefits.  For more details and references see Abbring, van den Berg, and van
Ours (1997).
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23. A small part of the cost of UI—roughly 50 percent of the costs induced by UI ben-
efits paid during the first 13 weeks of unemployment—is covered by premiums
related to sectoral unemployment risk.
24. DI is arranged by a variety of laws from 1967 (referring to a law from 1930),
1976, and 1993, and is revised throughout.  Also, DI actually consists of two sep-
arate arrangements, one for the first 52 weeks of DI, and one for the remaining DI
spell.  In this chapter, we simply label both arrangements as DI.  See CTSV
(1997) for details.
25. It should be noted that Dutch DI also covers disability that is not work related,
however.
26. Analysis of DWS data typically focuses on joblessness, rather than unemploy-
ment, since information on labor-force participation is not available.
27. For additional information on the Displaced Worker Supplements, as well as
excellent reviews of research using these and other data sources, see Fallick 1996
or Kletzer 1998.
28. Researchers have used a variety of strategies in an attempt to surmount this short-
coming.  For instance, displacement probabilities are sometimes calculated by
assuming that the number of persons at risk of permanent layoff (the denominator
of the displacement rate) is equal to the number employed at the survey date.
Similarly, the quasi-longitudinal nature of the Current Population Survey Outgo-
ing Rotation Group data has been used to construct estimates of the earnings
changes of nondisplaced workers, which can then be compared to those of job los-
ers.  Farber (1993) is an example of a study using several of these techniques.
29. Studies using longitudinal data include Topel (1990); Ruhm (1991a); and Stevens
(1997).  Administrative data have been utilized by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sulli-
van (1993) and Schoeni and Dardia (1996), among others.
30. Note that the structure of the FE data is similar to that of the Japanese data used in
this volume.
31. The remaining spells are completed for quantitatively less important reasons like
death, military service, self-employment, or permanent 100 percent benefit reduc-
tions because, for instance, of noncompliance with eligibility rules.
32. Thus, we do not miss transitions made between two consecutive interview dates,
assuming recall errors are absent.
33. We exclude 46 individuals whose interviews are not successive.  This reconstruc-
tion covers at most the five-year period 1985 until the end of 1990 for respondents
who participated in all waves, and some retrospective information on the state
occupied at the date of the first interview.  See van den Berg, Lindeboom, and
Ridder (1994) for an analysis of attrition using these data.  They found that the
effects of attrition on estimates of transition models are unimportant.
34. Unemployment and not-in-the-labor-force are differentiated by requiring those
who are unemployed to actively search for a job.
35. Job-to-job changes are recorded.  The motive or cause is selected from an exten-
sive list.
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36. Farber (1997) included in this category job loss for “other” reasons in his analysis.
We have deleted persons in this category from our calculations.  In a recent analy-
sis of additional data collected on respondents to the 1996 DWS who report being
displaced for “other” reasons, Farber (1998) concluded that fewer than one-quar-
ter of persons giving this response had “involuntary” job losses (and some of
these may have left temporary or seasonal jobs).  It is also worth noting that work-
ers whose contracts expire do not fit neatly into any of the DWS categories.
These individuals might classify themselves as displaced for “other” reasons or,
alternatively, say that their position has been abolished or that they have con-
cluded a temporary job.
37. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Hall (1995) estimated the
rate of permanent layoffs to be around 1.8 percent per quarter or roughly 7 percent
per year.  Using the same data source, Stevens (1997) estimates, however, that
annual displacement rates are only around half as large.  On the other hand,
Hamermesh (1989) indicated that displacement rates were 20 to 40 percent higher
in the 1980s than the 1970s.
38. The issue of multiple turnover was discussed in Ruhm (1987) and played a key
role in the analysis made by Stevens (1997).
39. Farber (1997) estimated that 30 percent of persons losing jobs in a given year are
again displaced at some point during the next three.  Stevens (1997) estimated
annual displacement rates of between 10 and 12 percent in the two years follow-
ing an initial job loss.
40. Assume that 100 individuals are displaced in each year between 1993 and 1995.
Under the second assumption above, 10 persons terminating jobs in 1994 will also
have been displaced in 1993 and so only 90 of the job losses will be recorded in
the 1996 DWS.  Similarly, 10 of those terminated in 1995 will have had a 1993
job loss and 9 of them a 1994 displacement.  Therefore, workers identified as dis-
placed in 1995 will constitute 81 out of 271 sample members.
41. Men and women losing jobs in 1995 account for 46.2 and 48.5 percent of the 1996
DWS samples, implying inflation factors of 1.545 (0.462/0.299) and 1.622
(0.485/0.299) respectively.  In the absence of recall bias, observed displacements
might be concentrated in the later years if the rate of job loss actually increased
over time.  Given that the economy was improving, however (unemployment fell
from 6.9 percent in 1993 to 5.6 percent in 1995), this seems unlikely.
42. A common inflation factor is used to account for the effects of recall bias, with no
attempt made to differentiate as a function of job seniority.  In fact, 58 percent of
observed displacements involving those with less than one year of tenure occur in
1995, suggesting that recall bias is particularly severe for this group.
43. A multivariate analysis by Farber (1993) indicated a strong monotonic decline in
the risk of job loss with tenure.  Fallick (1996) summarized evidence suggesting
that the protective effect of tenure decreases over time.
44. A more complete measure of aggregate displacement can be computed from the
FE data on a much shorter time interval.  This measure and its differences from
the UI measure will be discussed later.
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45. Note that we will show later that displacement rates are lower again in 1994–
1996.
46. Analyses based on the FE data draw on results from a project on crowding out of
low-skilled workers, in which three of the authors of this chapter are involved at
the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in The Hague.
47. Note that we observe that workers are on a fixed-term contract only once they
separate for that reason; so we cannot exclude these workers from the data set.
This is not a serious problem, however, as we condition on tenure, which seems
more relevant as a determinant of the risk set for displacement.
48. If, for example, Philips displaces all workers at its computer division and at the
same time expands its audio and video divisions, we will underestimate the true
displacement rate when we use the net employment criterion.
49. The relatively low displacement rate of the lowest tenure group could be an arti-
fact of the FE sampling procedure, which undersamples workers who separate
within a year (see the data section).  Note that the FE data are administrative and
cannot suffer from recall bias as the DWS possibly does.  On the other hand, the
nonmonotonicity could be explained by a learning model along the lines of
Jovanovic (1979).
50. See the institutions section for a discussion of collective agreements in the Neth-
erlands.
51. See the discussion of the role of sanctions in the data and transitions sections.  We
do not exclude low-tenure individuals.  However, the UI eligibility requirements
would prevent most of the low-tenure workers from ending up in UI.  Also note
that we will conclude later that a large proportion of displaced workers in the
Netherlands experience no unemployment spells at all, which implies that the UI
data may well underestimate the true displacement rate.
52. Displacements are also associated with lower employment probabilities for
women, although the differences are less dramatic for men.
53. This is consistent with Gibbons and Katz’s evidence (1991) that workers dis-
placed by plant closings are reemployed more quickly than those losing jobs due
to slack work or position or shift abolishment.  They attributed this to the possibil-
ity that plant closings affect a relatively random group of workers, whereas the
other types of job loss impact those of lower average quality.
54. Finding that advance notice is associated with the lower rates of joblessness but
without reductions in durations, conditional on a positive spell, is common in this
literature (see Addison and Portugal 1987; or Ehrenberg and Jakubson 1988).
Ruhm (1992, 1994) provided evidence that persons with short written notice have
longer spells and concluded that this occurs because firms disproportionately sup-
ply voluntary notice to workers with unobserved characteristics correlated with
low reemployment probabilities.  Previous research has also shown that union
membership, high predisplacement earnings, and depressed local labor market
conditions are associated with extended joblessness (see Fallick 1996 for exam-
ples).  Estimation of corresponding Weibull hazard models reveals that baseline
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rates decline over time.  This could reflect either observed heterogeneity (where
“better” workers get reemployed first) or duration dependence.
55. The total number of observations is smaller than in Table 2.13 because informa-
tion on sojourn times was missing in some cases.
56. See, for instance, Lancaster (1979).  The fact that median residual durations are
now longer for displaced workers can possibly be traced back to heterogeneity in
terms of unobserved and other observed characteristics.  Earlier analyses of the
same data by Abbring, van den Berg, and van Ours (1997) indeed did show that
both negative genuine duration dependence and observed and unobserved hetero-
geneity play a significant role in explaining the observed duration dependency
pattern.
57. Because of their flexibility and computational convenience, discrete distributions
for unobservables are frequently used in MPH analyses.  The flexibility of dis-
crete distributions as heterogeneity or mixture of distributions was illustrated by a
result of Heckman and Singer (1984) who showed that in MPH models the non-
parametric maximum likelihood estimator or the heterogeneity distribution is a
discrete distribution.  The estimation procedure requires the number of points of
support not to be fixed in advance, however, and the estimation of standard errors
is not straightforward.
58. Recall, however, that unobserved differences between the two groups of individu-
als may interfere with this argument.  The excess layoffs indicator, the “residual
size of the cell,” has a significantly positive effect on reemployment rates, which
could be explained as a signaling effect.  Workers who are involved in excess, or
even mass, layoffs, are more attractive than workers who are singled out for lay-
off.
59. The table includes an Information Matrix (IM) test on the unobserved heterogene-
ity parameters (see White 1982).  Chesher (1984) has shown that this test on the
equality of the score and Hessian representations of the IM can be interpreted as a
test of local parameter variation.  In this case, the IM test can be expected to detect
additional unobserved heterogeneity, and can be shown to be distributed with two
degrees of freedom.  Thus, the IM is rejected at just a 5 percent significance level.
Adding an additional mass point to the heterogeneity distribution does not change
the results, however, two mass points converge to the same value and other
parameter estimates are unaffected.
60. The DWS does not contain information on hourly earnings.  Crude controls for
part-time versus full-time work are available, but these are not used in the analysis
below because these changes are likely to be endogenous (e.g., some displaced
workers may be unable to obtain full-time jobs).
61. During the 1993–1995 period, the civilian unemployment rate averaged 6.2 per-
cent, 62.4 percent of the civilian population were employed, and real GDP grew
2.6 percent per year.  The comparable figures for the 1990–1992 time span were
6.6, 62.0, and 1.0 percent.  Herz (1990) and Farber (1997), among others, showed
that workers adjust more easily to displacements occurring during booming peri-
ods than when economic conditions are less favorable.  In addition, many of the
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earlier analyses have been restricted to groups likely to experience relatively large
wage losses, such as persons with more than three years’ tenure.
62. No effort is made to control for selection into employment.  Therefore these
results should be interpreted as providing information on the determinants of
wages (or earnings changes) conditional on survey-date employment.
63. Kletzer (1989), Addison and Portugal (1989), and Ruhm (1990), among others,
provided earlier related analyses.
64. Other research also suggests the usefulness of distinguishing between general and
specific human capital.  For example, larger losses have been found for displaced
workers who switch industries than for those who do not; see Kletzer (1998) for a
detailed summary of this literature.
65. Gibbons and Katz (1991) indicated smaller displacement-induced losses for those
affected by plant closings than for other job losers but, as mentioned, do not dis-
tinguish between slack work and position or shift abolishment.
66. Source: CBS (1998, 1991).
67. There are several reasons for this loss of observations.  First, the starting date of
the initial observed labor market state can be missing.  In this case the different
states cannot be linked to a calendar time, a necessity for the inflation correction.
Second, the starting date may be inconsistent with the reported sojourn time,
given the date of the first interview.  Finally, one or more sojourn times may be
missing.
68. Note that most observations are lost because tenure is missing: tenure is observed
for 1,069 of the 1,551 observations.  Of these 1,069 cases, 168 cases concern dis-
placement.  Of the 668 observations with sufficient tenure, 116 concern displace-
ment, which is 69 percent of 168.  This number is referred to in the discussion of
the UI inflow measure later on.
69. The labor-force participation rates of 45- to 54- and 55- to 64-year-old men
(women) were 89 and 67 (75 and 50) percent, respectively, in 1996 (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 1997).  In contrast, 35- to 44-year-olds were only marginally more
likely than those age 45 to 54 to participate (92 percent of the men and 78 percent
of the women).  The lack of research on displacement and retirement is probably
due to the difficulty in using the DWS for this type of analysis.  The small bit of
earlier literature that is relevant to this issue uncovered little evidence that dis-
placements have strong effects on retirement ages.
70. Workers with less than a year on the predisplacement job are retained in this por-
tion of the analysis because the end of even a brief job has the potential of creating
considerable adjustment problems for older workers.  In addition, information on
prior tenure is unavailable for nondisplaced workers, making it difficult to under-
take the comparison procedure discussed next.
71. To reduce fluctuations due to small sample sizes (particularly for displaced work-
ers) the probabilities are  actually calculated as three-year averages centered
around the specific age (for example, the retirement or disability rate for “60-
year-olds” is actually the average retirement or disability rate of 59- to 61-year-
olds).
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72. These conditional probabilities are analogous but not identical to hazard rates.
They differ in part because 1) some men who are initially nonparticipants might
reenter the labor force during the compensation period; 2) “lagged” status is cal-
culated for slightly younger workers in 1996, rather than for the same cohort of
men in an earlier year; 3) there can be some movement over time between “other”
reasons for nonparticipation and retirement or disability.
73. The unconditional retirement or disability probabilities for nondisplaced men are
15, 29, and 58 percent.
74. By construction of the data set, the remainder is in the 40–53 age group.
75. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, chap. 5, Table 1) provided a steady state
estimate of unemployment durations of around three months for 1988 for both
countries.  Furthermore, their Table 2 showed that this is fairly typical of the
period 1962–1989.  In the Netherlands, however, mean unemployment durations
are usually longer than one year: Layard, Nickell, and Jackman even gave a
steady state estimate of 25 months for 1988.  Also, median reemployment dura-
tions of displaced workers in our 1992 UI data set for the Netherlands (20 weeks;
see Table 2.16) are substantially longer than median reemployment durations in
our U.S. data set (7 weeks).  This is remarkable, as our data set excludes workers
entering other schemes and hardly ever returning to employment, and includes at
least some short-tenure workers, who can be expected to be more mobile.
76. These problems have recently been encountered by Cohen, Lefranc, and Saint-
Paul (1997), who compared the U.S. and French labor markets.  Using the
Enquete Emploi, collected by the INSEE, for France and the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics for the United States, they found that wage discounts after dis-
placement are roughly the same in both countries.  The discussion following the
paper, however, showed that it is not easy to draw and clear conclusions from this.
77. An additional empirical problem is that the postdisplacement wage will frequently
be unobserved for these workers due to right-censored unemployment spells.
78. Of course, workers in the United States also have incentives to avoid unemploy-
ment and to find new jobs prior to job loss, but they are generally weaker incen-
tives.
79. See the section on labor market transitions following displacement.  We exclude
individuals who are living abroad.
80. This may be due to DI legislation, however.  Partly disabled workers have to find
a job for their remaining work capacity because of a rule that came into effect in
1987.  We cannot distinguish these cases, but the rule only affects observations in
part of our observation period (see Hassink, van Ours, and Ridder 1997).
150Table 2.1 Netherlands: Overview of the Data Sets







2-yr. rotating panel 4 waves
 (1991–92, 1992–93, 
1993–94, 1994–95)





4 waves (1985, 1986, 1988, 1990)




UI inflow 1992 (spells followed up 
to Sept. 1993)
209,478 cases
Key feature Worker transitions into and out
 of firms
Full individual labor market 
histories
Transitions into and out of UI
Displacement criterion Separations labeled as layoffs and 
those from shrinking firms
Layoffs for economic reasons UI inflow (minus sanctions 
responsibility for job loss)
Tenure restriction Tenure ≥1 yr. Tenure ≥1 yr. Entitlement to UI
Information on












state after 1 yr.
No Yes Nod







a However, the corresponding aggregate time series on UI inflow over the period 1970–93 are used to construct displacement-rate time
series.
b Only for displacement identified by separations from shrinking firms, some job-to-job transitions are recorded; thus the probability of a
positive spell of joblessness is overestimated.
c The LFS data are not used here, however, because of the superiority of the UI data for this purpose.
d We observe whether an individual leaves UI and why (i.e., to what labor market state), but not the subsequent labor market transitions
made.
e These data can be used to construct circumstantial evidence, but we employ results from other studies using data that are better suited to
analyze these issues.
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Table 2.2 United States: “Lower-Bound” Estimates of Annual 
Displacement Rates (%)
Time period All workers Men Women
1981–83 3.8 4.4 3.0
1983–85 3.0 3.4 2.5
1985–87 2.7 3.1 2.2
1987–89 2.4 2.6 2.1
1989–91 3.4 4.0 2.8
1991–93 3.2 3.6 2.7
1993–95 3.1 3.4 2.8
NOTE: The table refers to job loss among 20- to 64-year-olds (at the survey date) due
to plant closing, slack work, or position or shift abolishments.
SOURCE: Estimates obtained by dividing by three the estimates for three-year dis-
placement rates calculated by Farber (1997).
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Table 2.3 United States: Estimated Annual Displacement Rates during 
the 1993–95 Period by Predisplacement Job Tenure (%) 
Tenure (yr.) All workers Men Women
All displacementsa,b
All 4.9 5.3 4.5
<1 5.9 6.7 5.1
>1 4.6 4.9 4.3
1–2 9.9 10.9 9.0
3–4 4.7 5.6 4.0
5–9 3.5 4.0 3.0
≥10 2.7 2.5 2.9
Displacements resulting in 
joblessnessc
All 4.2 4.5 3.9
<1 5.1 5.7 4.4
>1 3.9 4.2 3.7
1–2 8.5 9.3 7.7
3–4 4.0 4.8 3.5
5–9 3.0 3.4 2.6
≥10 2.3 2.1 2.5
NOTE: Estimates for overall and gender-specific annual displacement rates are
obtained using the lower-bound displacement rates in Table 2.2 and then inflating
them via the procedure discussed in the text.
a Tenure-specific rates are calculated by multiplying the overall displacement rate by
the ratio of the fraction of displaced workers with the specified amount of tenure
divided by the franction of all workers with that amount of tenure.  For example, the
displacement rate for persons with 1–2 years of seniority is calculated as 0.049 x
0.268/0.132 = 0.099.
b Results for all types of permanent job loss.
c Restricted to displacements resulting in an initial spell of joblessness.
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Table 2.4 United States: Estimated Annual 
Displacement Rates during the 1993–95 
Period by Age (%)










NOTE: Estimates for overall displacement rates are obtained from
Table 2.3.  Age-specific rates are calculated by adjusting the
overall rate by the relative age-specific differences in displace-
ment probabilities calculated by Farber (1997).
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Table 2.5 Netherlands: Reported Labor Market States of Workers at Strongly Shrinking Firms, 1993–96 (% of 
Employment at all Firms)















































NOTE: Workers older than 60 years are excluded, as are workers with less than one year’s tenure.
a Firm shares are computed among firms with workers in the selected category.
b Separations only from strongly shrinking firms added to annual displacement rates.
c Total displacement as a percentage of total employment.  Displacement includes “layoffs” (excluding layoffs during test periods) at all
firms, plus transitions into “new jobs,” “early retirement,” and “DI” at strongly shrinking firms.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.6 Annual Displacement Rates by Tenure during 
the 1993–95 Period (%)
Tenure (yr.) All workers Men Women
All 4.1 4.2 4.0
<1 5.8 6.3 5.2
1–2 8.1 9.2 6.7
3–4 4.7 5.2 4.0
5–9 3.0 3.0 2.9
≥10 1.9 1.9 2.0
NOTE: Workers older than 60 are excluded.  Displacement is
identified with “layoffs” (excluding “layoffs during test periods”)
at any firm, plus transitions into “new jobs,” “early retirement,”
and “DI” at firms with net employment changes < –30%.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.7 Netherlands: Displacement and Other Separation Frequencies 
1993–96 (%)
Variable No transition Displaced Other outflow
All 88.3 3.8 7.8
Year
1993 87.2 7.6 5.2
1994 89.8 2.9 7.4
1995 88.3 3.6 8.1
1996 88.1 1.7 10.2
Gender
Female 87.0 3.6 9.4
Male 89.1 3.9 7.0
Tenure (yr.)
<1 88.0 4.5 7.5
1–2 81.7 6.8 11.5
3–4 87.1 4.0 9.0
5–10 91.3 2.6 6.1
>10 93.9 1.7 4.4
Coll. agreement
CAOa 88.8 3.6 7.7
AVVb 85.8 5.2 9.0
None 87.3 4.3 8.4
Job complexity level
Low 82.6 5.7 11.8
Intermediate 89.5 3.4 7.1
High 91.3 3.3 5.4
Education (yr.)
≤10 87.4 4.3 8.4
>10 – <15 89.9 3.1 7.1
≥15 89.6 3.3 7.1
Age (yr.)
18–19 72.3 10.7 17.0
(continued)
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Table 2.7 (continued)
Variable No transition Displaced Other outflow
20–29 83.0 5.8 11.2
30–39 89.7 3.4 6.9
40–49 93.0 2.6 4.4
≥50 90.4 2.1 7.5
NOTE: Workers older than 60 are excluded, as are workers with less than one year’s
tenure (except in the row giving results for these workers).  Displacement is identified
with “layoff” (excluding “layoffs during test periods”) at any firm, plus transitions
into “new jobs,” “early retirement,” and “DI” at firms with net employment changes
< –30%.
a Covered by a collective agreement.
b Covered by a mandatory extension of a CAO.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.8 Netherlands: Logit Estimates of 
Probability of Displacement
Variablea Estimate (std. error)
Intercept –11.21*** (2.58)
log Age 8.15*** (1.62)
(log Age)2 –1.13*** (0.23)
Woman –0.36*** (0.05)
log Tenure –0.54*** (0.05)
(log Tenure)2 0.02 (0.02)
log Wage –2.52*** (0.31)
(log Wage)2 0.20*** (0.05)
Part-time –0.24*** (0.05)
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Table 2.8 (continued)









Year = 1993 1.46*** (0.06)
Year = 1994 0.38*** (0.06)
Year = 1995 1.07*** (0.06)
log L –32,842.81
N 100,908
NOTE: Logit estimates with dependent states
“displaced” and “not displaced” (reference
state).  Workers older than 60 or with tenure less
than one year are excluded.  Displacement is
identified with “layoffs” (excluding “layoffs
during test periods”) at any firm, plus transitions
into “new jobs,” “early retirement,” and “DI” at
firms with net employment changes < –30%.
Wages are real gross hourly wages (in Dutch
guilders) including extra time payments, profit
sharing, etc.  *** = statistically significant at the
1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5%
level; * = statistically significant at the 10%
level.
a Age and tenure are measured in years.  Refer-
ence states are “male,” “full-time,” “high job
complexity,” “IT,” “no collective wage agree-
ment,” “agriculture/mining,” “firm with < 10
workers,” and “year = 1996.”
b “CAO” refers to coverage by a collective agree-
ment, “AVV” to coverage by a mandatory exten-
sion of such an agreement.
c Firm size is measured by the number of employ-
ees.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.9 Netherlands: Simulated Annual Displacement 
Probabilities (%)
Variable Not displaced Displaced
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Table 2.9 (continued)






NOTE: Based on logit estimates (see Table 2.8), evaluated at the mean characteristics
of the population over the period 1993–96.  Displacement is identified with “layoffs”
(excluding “layoffs during test periods”) at any firm, plus transitions into “new jobs,”
“early retirement,” and “DI” at firms with net employment changes < –30%.
a “CAO” refers to coverage by a collective agreement, “AVV” to coverage by a man-
datory extension of such an agreement.
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Table 2.10 United States: Duration of Postdisplacement Joblessness
All displacements
Displacements resulting in 
joblessness
% reemployed within % reemployed within
Variable 6 mo. 1 yr. 6 mo. 1 yr.
All displaced workers 67.3 76.1 61.0 71.7
Gender
Male 69.7 77.8 63.5 73.2
Female 64.0 74.3 57.7 69.8
Age (yr.)
20–29 70.9 78.0 66.5 75.7
30–39 72.4 79.6 66.7 75.4
40–49 67.8 79.0 61.5 74.8
50–54 58.8 68.9 50.3 62.5
55–59 52.7 63.0 42.3 54.8
60–64 44.0 53.0 34.5 45.1
Job tenure (yr.)
1–2 70.0 77.8 65.2 74.2
3–4 66.6 76.5 61.1 72.7
5–9 67.7 74.4 60.4 68.7
≥10 64.2 76.0 55.8 70.4
NOTE: Data are weighted so as to be nationally representative.The data apply to work-
ers who were 20 to 64 years old at the survey date and were displaced from jobs last-
ing more than one year in 1993 or 1994.
SOURCE: From the February 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement.
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Table 2.11 United States: Labor-Force Status of Displaced Workers (%)
Variable Employed Unemployed Out of labor force
All displaced workers 73.7 14.7 11.6
Gender
Male 76.5 16.5 6.9
Female 69.9 12.3 17.8
Age (yr.)
20–29 77.9 15.2 7.0
30–39 77.3 12.0 10.7
40–49 76.5 14.5 9.0
50–54 66.2 19.5 14.3
55–59 58.8 18.1 23.1
60–64 42.6 19.6 37.8
Job tenure (yr.)
1–2 73.6 16.2 10.2
3–4 74.7 12.8 12.6
5–9 76.6 14.7 8.7
≥10 70.0 15.0 15.2
NOTE: The table shows the labor-force status in February 1996 of 20- to 64-year-old
persons displaced from jobs lasting more than one year during the 1993–95 period.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement and are weighted so
as to be nationally representative.
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Table 2.12 United States: Econometric Estimates of the Determinants of 
Postdisplacement Joblessness
Regressor





3–4 0.047  (0.089) 0.116 (0.073) 0.028 (0.055)
5–9 0.052  (0.090) –0.017 (0.075) 0.006 (0.090)
≥10 0.095  (0.096) –0.054* (0.083) –0.007 (0.073)
Age (yr.)
30–39 –0.052  (0.094) –0.118 (0.078) –0.107  (0.069)
40–49 –0.134  (0.099) –0.185** (0.082) –0.184** (0.072)
50–54 –0.212  (0.133) –0.479*** (0.113) –0.442*** (0.100)
55–59 –0.138  (0.146) –0.704*** (0.137) –0.583*** (0.117)




0.321**  (0.134) 0.271*** (0.105) 0.303***  (0.096)
Some college 0.341**  (0.135) 0.319*** (0.105) 0.345*** (0.096)
College grad. 0.394*** (0.144) 0.387*** (0.115) 0.416***  (0.104)
Grad. school 0.480*** (0.170) 0.304** (0.140) 0.381***  (0.125)
Married 0.135*  (0.069) 0.027 (0.058) 0.059*** (0.051)
Man –0.007  (0.065) 0.231*** (0.055) 0.182*** (0.049)
Nonwhite –0.285**  (0.113) –0.188** (0.087) –0.228*** (0.080)
Native born 0.387*** (0.131) –0.006 (0.090) 0.093 (0.084)
Source of
 job loss
Plant closing 0.066  (0.084) 0.072 (0.058) 0.075  (0.060)
Slack work 0.034  (0.087) 0.010 (0.073) 0.021 (0.065)
Written notice
(months)
<1 –0.018  (0.112) –0.036 (0.095) –0.033 (0.084)
(continued)
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Table 2.12 (continued)
Regressor




1–2 –0.139  (0.108) –0.139 (0.086) –0.154** (0.078)
>2 0.209 **  (0.089) –0.048 (0.082) 0.039 (0.070)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample includes persons displaced 
from jobs lasting more than one year in 1993, 1994, or 1995 who were between the 
ages of 20 and 64 in February 1996.  The reference groups for the sets of dummy vari-
ables are persons with 1–2 years of tenure on the predisplacement job, 20- to 29-year-
olds, high school dropouts, those losing jobs due to a position or shift abolishment, 
and those with no written advance notice.  *** = Statistically significant at the 1% 
level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 
10% level.
a This column shows the results of a probit model where the dependent variable is equal 
to 1 if the respondent obtains a new job within one week of the displacement and zero 
otherwise.
b This column indicates coefficients for a Cox proportional hazard model where the 
dependent variable is weeks of joblessness and the sample is restricted to persons out 
of work for at least one week following displacement.
c This column shows results for a Cox proportional hazard model estimated over all dis-
placed workers where the dependent variable is weeks of joblessness plus one-half 
week.
SOURCE: From the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement.
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Table 2.13 Netherlands: Displacement by Motivation and Transition
Table 2.14 Netherlands: Reported Labor Market States of Separated 
Workers by Net Employment Change (%)
Motivationa
Worker category 1 2 3 4 5 All
Transitionb E-E 30 162 1 37 — 230
E-U 6 47 0 15 — 68
E-N 7 14 3 — 5 29
All 43 223 4 52 5 327
Workers with 
tenure ≥1 year
Transitionb E-E 19 76 1 17 — 113
E-U 1 21 0 10 — 32
E-N 2 11 1 — 3 17
All 22 108 2 27 3 162
NOTE: Rows correspond to self-reported combinations of motivation for and volun-
tariness of transition.
a 1 = “would have lost job anyway”; 2 = “reorganization or plant closure”; 3 = “invol-
untary early retirement”; 4 = “DI”; and 5 = “voluntary disability” (E-N only).
b E-E = job-to-job transitions, E-U = employment-to-unemployment transitions, and
E-N = employment-to-not-in-labor-force transition.
SOURCE: Based on the LFS.





All workers 24.9 19.4 2.9 1.9
Outflow 44.3 34.5 5.1 1.8
Other firms
All workers 3.3 4.6 0.5 0.4
Outflow 31.0 43.4 4.9 3.5
NOTE: Workers older than 60 and workers with tenure less than one year have been
excluded.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.15 Netherlands: Labor Market State One Year after 
Displacement by Transition
Labor market statea
Worker category E S U N M F All
Transitionb E-E 143 0 3 1 0 0 147
E-U 17 2 27 1 0 1 48
E-N 4 0 0 18 0 0 22
All 164 2 30 20 0 1 217
Workers with 
tenure ≥1 year
Transitionb E-E 75 0 1 1 0 0 77
E-U 6 1 17 0 0 1 25
E-N 2 0 0 12 0 0 14
All 83 1 18 13 0 1 116
a E = “employed”; S = “self-employed”; U = “unemployed and searching”; N = “not-
in-labor-force”; M = “military service”; and F = “full-time education.”
b E-E = job-to-job transitions, E-U = employment-to-unemployment transitions, and
E-N = employment-to-not-in-the-labor-force.
SOURCE: Based on the LFS.
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Table 2.16 Netherlands: Median Residual Reemployment Durations 
(weeks)
Worker category At 0 weeks At 26 weeks







30≤ – <40 23.2 91.3




80≤ – <110 26.6 106.9













Not married 15.4 92.0
NOTE: Durations are observed in intervals and may be right-censored.  Medians are
computed using the actuarial method, i.e., assuming that censoring and reemployment
durations are uniformly distributed within observational intervals.
a  is used to denote medians larger than the longest completed spell observed, i.e.,
that are beyond the scope of the data set.





170 Abbring, van den Berg, Gautier, van Lomwel, van Ours, and Ruhm
Table 2.17 Netherlands: Mixed Proportional Hazard 
Estimates of Reemployment Durations
Variablea Estimate (std. error)
Nondisplaced (sanction) –0.18*** (0.04)
Sanctions/cell memberb 0.01 (0.07)
Predicted size cell ( ) –1.42*** (0.15)
Residual size cell (  ) 0.35*** (0.05)
log Agec 0.89*** (0.28)
(log Age)2 –0.93*** (0.12)
log Waged 0.18*** (0.03)
(log Wage)2 0.09*** (0.02)









8–16 weeks –0.13*** (0.04)
16–24 weeks –0.26*** (0.05)
24–32 weeks –0.43*** (0.06)
32–45 weeks –0.80*** (0.07)
45–58 weeks –1.05*** (0.10)




IM mixing dist.f 6.95 (2)
Wald sectors 628.99 (16)
ĉ
ε̂
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Test Statistic (d.f.)
Wald months 108.54 (11)
Wald provinces 20.75 (11)
NOTE: Sector, month of inflow, and province dummy variables are
included.  *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = sta-
tistically significant at the 5% level.
a All variables are included in deviation from their sample means.
Reference interval for the piecewise constant baseline hazard is 0–
8 weeks.
b Cell refers to municipality × month of inflow UI × sector – groups.
The sanction rate in each cell is included as a regressor.  Also, the
number of individuals in each cell is regressed on municipality,
month of inflow UI, and sector dummies, which gives predicted
cell counts  and residuals .
c “Age” = age/10.
d Wage is daily wage in referral period in 100 Dutch guilders.
e Wages are right-censored at 430 guilders. 
f IM = a test statistic for local parameter variation in (v1, v2), or,
equivalently, (v1, v2, p1, p2); Wald-tests for the joint significance of
the three groups of dummy variables. All tests are asymp-
totically 2 distributed with the degrees of freedom given in paren-
theses.
SOURCE: Based on the UI data.
ĉ ε̂
χ
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Table 2.18 Netherlands: Simulated Reemployment Probabilities
Variable Pr(t ≤ 26 weeks) Pr(t ≤ 52 weeks)

























Not married 0.56 0.74
NOTE: Probabilities are computed using the model estimates of Table 2.17.  The sam-
ple mean is computed at the mean of the regressors in the sample used for estimation
and the estimated mean of the unobserved heterogeneity component.  All other rows
correspond to single deviations from this mean.
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Table 2.19 United States: Ratio of Average Survey Date and 
Predisplacement Weekly Earnings
Category
Conditional on survey 
date employment Unconditional
All displaced workers 1.00 0.70






















NOTE: The table shows average values of the ratio of survey date (February 1996) to
predisplacement weekly wages, both measured in February 1996 dollars, using the
all-items Consumer Price Index to adjust for price changes.  The sample includes per-
sons aged 20–64 at the survey date who lost jobs lasting more than one year in 1993,
1994, or 1995 due to slack work, plant closing, or position or shift abolishment.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Workers Supplement and are weighted so
as to be nationally representative.
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Table 2.20 Distribution of the Ratio of Survey Date to Predisplacement  
Wages
All displaced workers 25- to 49-year-old men
Wage ratio Conditionala Unconditional Conditional Unconditional
<0.75 0.323 0.523 0.276 0.449
0.75–0.89 0.136 0.096 0.134 0.102
0.9–1.09 0.262 0.184 0.286 0.218
1.1–1.25 0.096 0.068 0.105 0.080
>1.25 0.184 0.129 0.199 0.151
NOTE: The table shows the distribution of the ratio of survey date (February 1996) to
predisplacement weekly wages.  Predisplacement earnings are in February 1996 dol-
lars, using the all-items Consumer Price Index to adjust for price changes.  The sam-
ple includes persons aged 20–64 at the survey date who lost jobs lasting more than
one year in 1993, 1994, or 1995 due to slack work, plant closing, or a position or shift
abolishment.
a The conditional estimates are for reemployed workers only.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Workers Supplement and are weighted so
as to be nationally representative.
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Table 2.21 United States: Econometric Estimates of the Determinants of 
Postdisplacement Earnings and Earnings Changes
Postdisplacement wages Change in wages
Regressora (1)b (2)c (3)d
Job tenure (yr.)
3–4 0.062 (0.047) 0.039 (0.044) –0.031 (0.047)
5–9 0.091** (0.049) 0.018 (0.046) –0.024 (0.049)
≥10 0.087 (0.054) –0.081 (0.051) –0.187*** (0.054)
Age (yr.)
30–39 0.127** (0.050) –0.045 (0.048) –0.153*** (0.050
40–49 0.142*** (0.053) –0.041 (0.051) –0.061*** (0.053)
50–54 0.067 (0.073) –0.087 (0.069) –0.181*** (0.073
55–59 0.018 (0.085) –0.177** (0.080) –0.283*** (0.085)




0.215*** (0.069) 0.081 (0.064) –0.002 (0.068)
Some college 0.383*** (0.070) 0.144* (0.065) 0.007 (0.069)
College grad. 0.546*** (0.075) 0.237*** (0.071) 0.027 (0.074)
Grad. school 0.766*** (0.091) 0.325*** (0.086) 0.029 (0.089)
Married 0.025 (0.037) 0.010 (0.035) 0.000 (0.037)
Male –0.428*** (0.036) 0.201*** (0.036) 0.041 (0.036)
Nonwhite –0.050 (0.057) 0.030 (0.055) 0.045 (0.058)
Native born –0.010 (0.060) –0.022 (0.057) –0.048 (0.061)
Source of 
job loss
Plant closing –0.050 (0.043) –0.010 (0.041) 0.039 (0.043)
Slack work –0.026 (0.047) 0.061 (0.044) 0.120*** (0.047)
Written notice 
(mo.)
<1 –0.045 (0.061) –0.054 (0.057) –0.056 (0.061)
1–2 0.025 (0.057) 0.002 (0.054) –0.007 (0.058)
>2 0.023 (0.051) –0.012 (0.048) –0.050 (0.051)
(continued)
176 Abbring, van den Berg, Gautier, van Lomwel, van Ours, and Ruhm
Table 2.21 (continued)
Postdisplacement wages Change in wages
Regressora (1)b (2)c (3)d
Year of 
displacement
1994 –0.041 (0.043) –0.013 (0.041) 0.016 (0.044)
1995 –0.075* (0.042) –0.039 (0.039) –0.009 (0.042)
Union 0.032 (0.052) –0.021 (0.049) –0.061 (0.052)
Predisplace-
ment wage — 0.599*** (0.029) —
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  The sample includes persons between the
ages of 20 and 64 who were displaced from jobs lasting more than one year in 1993,
1994, or 1995 and were reemployed in February 1996.  *** = Statistically significant
at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% level.
a The reference groups for the sets of dummy variables are persons with 1–2 years’ ten-
ure on the predisplacement job, 20- to 29-year-olds, high school dropouts, those losing
jobs due to position or shift abolishments, and those with no written advance notice.
b The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly wages at the survey date.  Predis-
placement wage is not included as a regressor.
c The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly wages at the survey date.  Predis-
placement wage is included as a regressor.
d The dependent variable is the difference in (the natural logs of) weekly wages at the
survey date and prior to displacement, both in February 1996 dollars.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement.
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Table 2.22 Netherlands: Estimates of Changes in Earnings after Displacement
 All workers
No tenure  criterion Tenure 1 yr. min. Workers with  tenure ≥1 yr.b
Variable estimate (std. error) estimate (std. error) estimate (std. error)
Constant 0.160*** (0.036) 0.197*** (0.038) 0.199*** (0.046)
log Tenurea 0.016* (0.009) –0.011 (0.015) –0.025 (0.018)
(log Tenure)2b –0.004 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 0.009 (0.016)
log Agec –0.101* (0.053) –0.087 (0.053) 0.002 (0.062)
(log Age)2b 0.272* (0.153) 0.281* (0.153) 0.190 (0.185)
Spelld –0.008*** (0.003) –0.008*** (0.003) –0.008** (0.004)
dIdispl e –0.003 (0.033) — —
dIIdispl f — –0.049 (0.040) –0.050 (0.038)
Female –0.025 (0.024) –0.024 (0.024) –0.024 (0.030)
Education
Intermediate –0.002 (0.027) –0.004 (0.027) 0.013 (0.032)
Higher –0.022 (0.035) –0.022 (0.035) –0.043 (0.041)
University –0.030 (0.056) –0.029 (0.055) –0.083 (0.068)
Married/cohabitating –0.049 (0.029) –0.051* (0.029) –0.067* (0.035)
Non-Dutch 0.078 (0.074) 0.069 (0.074) –0.012 (0.086)




No tenure  criterion Tenure 1 yr. min. Workers with  tenure ≥1 yr.b
Variable estimate (std. error) estimate (std. error) estimate (std. error)
R2 0.024 0.031 0.029
N 1,069 1,069 668
No. displaced 168 116 116
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Data on all transitions between jobs with or without intervening non-employment spells (E-E,
E-U-E, and E-N-E) are included.  Dependent variable is the change in log real after-tax monthly earnings between the pre- and postsep-
aration employment spell.  Reference states are “nondisplaced,” “male,” “primary/lower education,” “unmarried and not cohabitating,”
“Dutch,” and “tenure ≥ 1 year”; “log tenure,” “log age,” and “spell” are included in deviation from their sample means.  *** = Statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a “Tenure” = tenure on the preseparation job (in months).
b In “(log tenure)2” and “(log age)2,” both “log tenure” and “log age” are in deviation from their sample means, which correspond to geo-
metric means of tenure and age equal respectively to 18.0 months and 28.9 years in the full sample and 39.8 months and 29.9 years in the
tenure-restricted sample.
c “Age” = the age at the date of the first interview (in years).
d “Spell” = the duration of the non-employment spell between the pre- and postseparation jobs (in months); 0 for E-E cases.
e The variable dIdispl  = a dummy indicating whether the separation was caused by displacement, using the definition discussed in the text.
f The variable dIIdispl  = a dummy indicating whether the separation was caused by displacement, using the definition discussed in the text.
SOURCE: Based on the LFS.
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Table 2.23 United States: Survey Date Labor-Force Status of Displaced Workers (%)
All displaced Males Females
Age (yr.) In labor force Retired/disabled In labor force Retired/disabled In labor force Retired/disabled
30–39 81.3 1.5 95.6 2.0 81.6 1.0
40–49 91.0 1.2 93.4 1.9 87.6 0.3
50–54 85.7 6.5 92.5 3.8 76.1 10.3
55–59 76.9 13.5 81.5 13.9 69.9 12.8
60–64 62.1 30.5 68.8 28.4 54.9 32.8
NOTE: The table shows the labor-force status in February 1996 of persons displaced during the 1993–95 period, from jobs lasting more
than one year.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Worker supplement and are weighted so as to be nationally representative.
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Table 2.24 United States: Survey Date Labor-Force Status of Displaced 
and Nondisplaced Males (%)
Men, not displaced Men, displaced
Age (yr.) In labor force Retired/disabled In labor force Retired/disabled
44–46 90.4 5.9 93.8 1.6
47–49 90.0 7.1 91.5 3.0
50–52 86.4 11.1 95.0 2.2
53–55 81.5 14.1 90.8 4.7
56–58 75.3 21.5 81.9 16.5
59–61 68.0 29.3 79.7 16.7
62–64 46.0 52.1 61.8 34.9
NOTE: The table analyzes  labor-force status in February 1996.  “Displaced” individu-
als are those losing jobs during the 1993–95 period due to plant closing, slack work,
or a position or shift abolishment.
SOURCE: Data are from the February 1996 Current Population Survey and Displaced
Worker Supplement and are weighted so as to be nationally representative.
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Appendix
Details of Dutch Data Sources
THE FE DATA
The Firm Employment (FE) data were collected by the Dutch “Labor in-
spection,” which is part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, and
contain administrative data on workers employed in both the private and the
public sector.  For our analyses we use only private sector workers below 60
years of age with at least one year of tenure (unless stated otherwise). 
The data are collected yearly (in 1993–1996) as repeated cross-sections
from administrative wage records of a sample of firms by means of a stratified
two-step sampling procedure.  In October of each year, in the first step a sample
of firms is drawn.  In the second step, workers are sampled from administrative
records of these firms corresponding to two moments in time, one year before
the sampling date and at the sampling date.  As the two-step sampling proce-
dure is repeated in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, we have information on sepa-
ration and displacement between October 1992 and October 1993, October
1993 and October 1994, October 1994 and October 1995, and October 1995
and October 1996.  For notational convenience, we label these four data peri-
ods by 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, respectively.  It should be noted that work-
ers who enter and leave a firm between these two sampling moments are never
sampled by this method.
Because both the first-step firm sample and the second-step worker sample
are stratified, we have to reweigh the data before performing any (cross-) tab-
ulation.  Firm strata are distinguished by firm size (number of employees) and
sector.  The number of workers sampled per firm depends on firm size; whether
the worker is a new entrant, a stayer, or one who left in the previous period; and
whether the employee is covered by a collective agreement.  Weights for the
firm strata are computed from the “Business Statistics” of CBS.  Employee
weights are calculated from the CBS statistic “Jobs of Employees.”
Table 2.A1 provides some sample characteristics.  It is useful to mention
that the data contain very few missing cases.  Job-complexity levels, for exam-
ple, are known for more than 99 percent of the workers.  Below we provide in-
formation on the construction of some of the key variables.
Displacement
All workers with at least one year of tenure who are laid off, plus all sep-
arations because of disability (DI), early retirement, and transitions into other
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jobs directly at firms that face a (net) loss of more than 30 percent of their work-
force.
Other Outflow
Workers who separate from a firm that is not shrinking by at least 30 per-
cent because of (early) retirement, disability (DI), end of a test period, transi-
tion into another job, or expiration of a contract with a temporary work office.
Job-Complexity Level
We use the following classification of job-complexity levels:
Low
Simple, generally repetitive activities that take place under direct supervi-
sion.  Little or no formal schooling or experience is required. 
Intermediate
Less simple activities that partly take place without direct supervision.
Administrative or technical knowledge is often required. 
 High 
Activities that require a higher level of knowledge and experience and that
take place without direct supervision.  Also, management activities that require
an academic degree or comparable level of learning.
Tenure
Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling dates).
Wage
Monthly wages (including extra-time payments, profit shares, and so
forth) and hours worked are measured very accurately.  We calculate gross
hourly wages for each worker and deflate the wage by the all-item Consumer
Price Index.
Wage Agreement
We distinguish three types of wage contracts.  Most workers have a col-
lective agreement (CAO) which is negotiated at the sectoral level or by leading
firms within a sector.  The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has the
right to force all other firms within a sector to follow an existing CAO, a prac-
tice which is labeled by AVV.  The remaining workers have only bilateral em-
ployment contracts.  These workers are, in general, employed at higher
positions.
Displaced Workers in the United States and the Netherlands 183
Part-Time–Full-Time
Part-time refers to working less than 100 percent of the regular number of
hours in the worker’s industry.  Regular hours are determined by collective
agreements; currently about half of Dutch industries set regular hours at 36 per
week.
 Education
Education refers to years of completed education.  When it takes four years
to complete higher vocational education, the reported years of schooling will
be four years (plus the number of years it takes to finish high school and ele-
mentary school) even if the worker has spent more or fewer years to actually
complete his higher vocational degree.
THE UI DATA
The UI data set is provided by Dutch Social Security Council (SVr) and
contains administrative data from the sectoral organizations that implement the
unemployment insurance system.  Table 2.A2 reports results of our analysis of
UI data.  All cases of individuals applying for unemployment benefits in 1992
were included in the database, and, if necessary, followed up to September
1993.  We create an initial data set by restricting the raw data to cases that can
be linked to a local labor market—individuals who started collecting benefits
in 1992 for whom sector, municipality, and month of inflow are known.79  This
data set contains 219,531 cases and is used for computing characteristics of lo-
cal labor markets.  Excluding all cases for which one or more regressor vari-
ables are missing leaves 209,478 cases.  This data set is merged with local labor
market characteristics computed from the initial data set and becomes the point
of departure for the reemployment duration analysis.  Below we give some de-
tails on measurement and construction of some of the variables. 
Duration of Unemployment Insurance Benefits
 Both the duration of the insurance benefits period and the destination state
of individuals whose benefits expire are observed.  Durations are observed in
intervals.  Thirteen biweekly intervals cover the first half year.  Then we have
one six-week interval, for durations between 26 and 32 weeks.  On the interval
32 to 318 weeks we are able to distinguish 22 quarterly duration classes.  The
remaining durations are observed as being 318 weeks or longer.  Since we are
not considering benefit payments that started before 1992, and we are only fol-
lowing benefit recipients up to September 1993, there is no right-censoring be-
cause of observations in the residual class 318 weeks and higher.  We observe
unemployment spells that are continuing at the end of September 1993, how-
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ever, and transitions out of unemployment insurance to destinations other than
employment.  In our analysis, both are considered to be right-censored.
Sanctions
 The data set contains a variable indicating whether a sanction has been im-
posed at the start of the UI spell (because of a worker’s responsibility for be-
coming unemployed).  We do not use information on sanctions that are
imposed during the UI spell, as these are related to behavior during the unem-
ployment spell and not to any behavior that may have led to displacement.
Age
Age is computed as the age in years at the start of the individual’s benefits
spell.
Wage
Wage is the daily wage before taxes earned by the individual before be-
coming unemployed.  It is the wage that is used by the administrative organi-
zation to compute the level of benefits.  It is observed in 43 intervals—of width
10 f. up to 430 f.—and a residual interval for those earning over 430 f.  The
continuous wage variable is defined as the average wage in each wage class, or
435 f. for those in the highest wage class.  An additional dummy variable is in-
cluded for the highest wage class.
Provinces and Urbanization
Municipality codes are observed and recoded to provincial and urbaniza-
tion dummies.  The provinces are Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel,
Flevoland, Gelderland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg, Utrecht, Noord-Holland,
Zuid-Holland, and Zeeland.  Urbanized areas are municipalities that are highly
urbanized according to Statistics Netherlands (CBS): Amsterdam, Delft, The
Hague, Groningen, Haarlem, Leiden, Rijswijk, Rotterdam, Schiedam, Utrecht,
Vlaardingen, and Voorburg.
Part-Time–Full-Time
Like the wage information, this variable refers to the employment situation
of the benefits recipient preceding the unemployment spell.  Full-time refers to
working 100 percent or more of the regular number of hours.  Part-time refers
to working less than 100 percent of the regular number of hours.
THE LFS DATA
The OSA Labor Force Survey follows a random sample of households in
the Netherlands over time.  On the basis of these data, sequences of labor mar-
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ket states occupied by the respondents are reconstructed.  Table 2.A3 provides
some characteristics of the sample that is used in this chapter.  The following
labor market states are distinguished: employed, self-employed, unemployed,
not-in-labor-force, military service, and full-time education.  For each transi-
tion between two of these labor market states, the respondent is asked to pro-
vide a motive or cause selected from an extensive list of possible motives and
causes:
1. Due to Tweeverdienerswet (law on double-income households).
2. I wanted a more interesting job.
3. I wanted a more secure job.
4. I wanted a job with better career opportunities.
5. I wanted a better paying job.
6. I would have lost my job anyway.
7. Unemployment benefits are sufficient.
8. I wanted a job.
9. Reorganization or plant closure.
10. Bankruptcy.
11. Family business closed or reorganized.
12. Laid off for other reasons.
13. Early retirement.
14. Retired, living off my investments.
15. Disability.
16. Marriage.
17. Birth of a child.
18. Move of household or partner.
19. My family situation did not allow it anymore.
20. I wanted to earn my own wage or an extra wage again.
21. My family situation allowed it again.
22. I wanted to be more among people.
23. I wanted to attend classes again.
24. I just finished my education.
25. I had to fulfill military service.
26. I just fulfilled military service.
Most respondents, 78 percent, do not experience a labor market transition.
Almost all respondents make fewer than four transitions (99 percent).  The low
number of transitions can be explained by the relatively short observation pe-
riod (at most five years) and the fact that most respondents are breadwinners,
who can be expected to have low job mobility.  At the date of the first inter-
view, 62 percent of the respondents are employed, whereas 27 percent are non-
participants, and 7 percent are unemployed.
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In the LFS, three types of transitions can be the result of displacement:
job-to-job transitions (E-E), transitions from employment to unemployment
(E-U), and transitions from employment to not-in-the-labor-force (E-N).  As
noted earlier, the LFS provides a self-reported motive or cause for each transi-
tion in the data set, and it provides information on whether the transition was
made voluntarily.  This information can be used to identify displacement.  For
instance, if “reorganization or plant closure” is reported as a cause for leaving
a job, the worker is clearly displaced.  There are several other motives which
could indicate displacement.  It could have occurred through DI, in which case
disability may be reported as a cause for leaving employment.  In deciding
which motivation-voluntariness combinations identify displacement, we had to
recognize that the reported motivations and voluntariness are heavily liable to
subjective perceptions (like the distinction between a quit and a layoff).  Hav-
ing this in mind, we decided to consider transitions with the following motiva-
tion-voluntariness pairs as displacement.
The motivation “I would have lost my job anyway” will most likely be ap-
plicable to situations in which people anticipate displacement.  In this case we
take both voluntary and involuntary as involuntary transitions, because there
seems to be no reason to believe that one or the other excludes displacement.
The same holds for the cause “reorganization or plant closure.”  For the moti-
vation “early retirement” involuntary transitions seem most likely to denote
displacement.  Voluntary early retirements, on the other hand, will probably
cover individuals who prefer to stop working irrespective of economic condi-
tions in the firm; these individuals would have reported “would have lost job
anyway” in case of displacement.  Finally, we have the transitions into DI.  For
this motivation we distinguish between E-E and E-U transitions, on the one
hand, and E-N, on the other.  We think that in case of an E-E or E-U transition,
both voluntary and involuntary transitions denote displacement, because these
people keep working or are searching for a job after the transition; they are not
really incapacitated for work.80  For E-N transitions, we assume that displace-
ment is indicated by voluntary transitions, while involuntary transitions cover
transitions for pure medical reasons.
More details on the LFS data can be found in van den Berg and Ridder
(1998) and van den Berg (1992).
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Real gross hourly wage (guilders) 27.1
Total no. of workers 102,141
NOTE: Workers older than 60 and workers with less than one year’s tenure are
excluded.
a “Year” = the sampling year.  Note that data on two consecutive years for each worker
are collected at a single sampling date, October of the sample year, by reviewing the
administrative records of both the sampling date and one year before the sampling
date.
b “CAO” = coverage by a collective agreement.
c “AVV” = coverage by a mandatory extension of such a CAO.
SOURCE: FE data.
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Table 2.A2 Netherlands: Some Characteristics of UI Data
Characteristic




Transition into DI 0.07




Age (yr.) 32.0 10.9





NOTE: Wages are observed in 10-guilder intervals and are right-censored at 430 guil-
ders.  Sample mean and standard error of wages are computed by recoding wages to
mean interval wages, or to 435 guilders if right-censored.
a “Other” includes reaching age 65, death, military service, and self-employment,
among other things, all of which occur in less than 0.5 percent of the cases.
SOURCE: UI data.
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Table 2.A3 Netherlands: Characteristics of LFS Earnings Sample
All workers Workers with tenure ≥1 yr
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Ratio post- to preseparation 
earningsa
1.22 0.62 1.24 0.55
Tenure (months)b 44.4 71.0 67.5 81.5
Age (yr.)c 30.0 8.1 31.0 8.3
Spell (months)d 0.7 3.5 0.6 3.3
Spell (nonzero spells only, in 
months)
8.8 9.5 10.4 10.1
Education









Total no. of individuals 1,069 668
No. of nonzero intervening spells 81 37
a “Ratio post- to preseparation earnings” = real after-tax monthly earnings in the pre-
separation and the first postseparation jobs.
b “Tenure” =  tenure on the preseparation job; it is used to select the cases in the right
panel.
c “Age” = age at the date of the first interview.
d “Spell” = the duration of non-employment spell between the pre- and postseparation
jobs (0 for E-E cases).
e dIdispl is a dummy variable indicating whether the separation was caused by displace-
ment (1) or not (0), using the definition discussed in the main text.
f dIIdispl = dIdispl with the additional requirement that the tenure of the displaced individ-
ual equals at least one year.
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